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Abstract—We introduce the Xapagy cognitive architecture: a software
system designed to perform narrative reasoning. The architecture has
been designed from scratch to model and mimic the activities performed
by humans when witnessing, reading, recalling, narrating and talking
about stories.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
It was not only difficult for him to understand that the
generic term dog embraced so many unlike specimens of
differing sizes and different forms; he was disturbed by the
fact that a dog at three-fourteen (seen in profile) should
have the same name as the dog at three-fifteen (seen from
the front).
(“Funes the memorious” by Jorge Luis Borges)
This paper describes the Xapagy cognitive architecture. The system
is designed to perform narrative reasoning, an activity roughly
analogous to some of the mental processes humans perform with
respect to stories. Narrative reasoning includes:
• Witnessing a series of ongoing events (a story), keeping track
of the participants, their identity, properties and activities.
• Following a fixed story narrated in a language (for instance, by
reading a text or listening to another agent’s narration).
• Predicting future events in the story, expressing surprise when
unexpected events occur.
• Inferring events which (for some reason) were not witnessed;
understanding narrations where some events have been not
explicitly said (“reading between the lines”).
• Recalling a story, summarizing or elaborating on the remem-
bered story, chaining together remembrances.
• Daydreaming, confabulating new stories.
• Self-narrate the story by verbalizing the recalled or confabulated
story, for the narrating agent’s own use.
• Narrate the story to an audience, adapt the narration based on
feedback from an audience, elaborate on aspects of the story or
selectively narrate.
• Act as an audience for a narration, express surprise or puzzle-
ment, request clarification or elaboration for parts of the story
and ask questions.
• Perform collaborative story-telling, develop a story by alternat-
ing narrations from multiple agents.
The Xapagy architecture has been developed from scratch, rather
than as an evolution of an existing model from artificial intelligence or
cognitive science (but, naturally, building on the experience of these
systems). Starting from scratch was motivated partially by the fact
that the targeted behavior only partially overlaps with that of current
cognitive architectures. The other reason, however, was an attempt
to push the limits of the computational performance. We require
that the reasoning step (such as the reading, witnessing, recalling
or generating a sentence) to be performed in constant time on a
computer with an appropriate level of parallelism. The cumulative
computational complexity of all the algorithms used to perform the
reasoning step must be O(1).
This is an unusually restrictive requirement for any algorithm
in computer science, and artificial intelligence in particular. For
instance, in computational logic, an algorithm operating in O(n3)
might be considered fast, and intractable problems are legitimate
subjects of inquiry. It is true, using anytime algorithms [30] can
turn any architecture into a constant time architecture. We found
it useful, however, to search for algorithms which are naturally of
low complexity, rather than using high complexity algorithms with
anytime hooks. In this endeavor we are encouraged by the fact that
the human brain can perform narrative reasoning with only about a
dozen synapses separating input from output [27].
Describing a cognitive architecture built from scratch inevitably
requires a long list of definitions of primitive components. We antic-
ipate that the most challenging aspects for the reader will be “false
friends”: terms such as concept, instance, identity, verb and focus,
which in the Xapagy system have somewhat unexpected definitions.
To allow the reader to grasp the overall picture before proceeding
to a detailed description, Section II describes the organization of
the Xapagy architecture in a top down, informal way. This section
will also include a short tutorial to the Xapagy pidgin language
(Xapi). Section III describes the primitive components of the Xapagy
system and their elementary operations. Section IV focuses on story
following and shadowing which is the basic reasoning mechanism in
Xapagy. Section V describes the representation of problem domain
knowledge in Xapagy, as well as the core knowledge shared by all
Xapagy agents. This includes the representation of attributes, change,
ownership, grouping and scenes. Section VI discusses the representa-
tion of episodic knowledge. Section VII discusses the role of the Xapi
language in the narrative process and issues of reference resolution,
reference selection and verbalization. Section VIII discusses the im-
plementation of narrative reasoning such as recalling, confabulating
and narrating stories, as well as agent interaction with regards to
story telling. Section IX positions the Xapagy system relative to other
cognitive architectures and intelligent systems. Section X concludes
the paper.
Appendix A describes the notations and typographical conventions
used in the paper.
Note: this paper describes the architecture of the Xapagy software
system. Due to space limitations, we postponed for future pub-
lications the full detail description of such components such as
the shadow and headless shadow maintenance (Section IV-C and
Section VIII-A) and the detailed implementation of different recall
and confabulation models (Section VIII-C). Some of the examples
in the paper have been hand-engineered for illustration purposes
- usually by simplifying the real output and internal state of the
system. However, all the components described in the paper are
implemented and (at least to some degree) functional. Functionality
which is planned but not implemented is noted as such in the paper.
Whenever the paper refers to the “current version of the Xapagy
system”, it means core system Xapagy v0.9.32 with the language
model Xapi v3.2 and domain knowledge library XapagyDKL v0.20.
II. A TOP-DOWN INTRODUCTION
A. External look: the pidgin language
The Xapagy architecture describes the operation of an autonomous
agent which can directly witness events happening in the world, and
it can communicate with humans and other agents through the Xapi
pidgin language.
In linguistics, pidgin languages [26] are natural languages with
a simplified syntactic structure which appear when two groups of
people need to communicate without the time necessary to properly
learn each other’s languages. Pidgin languages are not the native
language of any group of people, and uniquely among human
languages, they have a limited expressiveness. Pidgins normally
evolve into full featured creole languages when they are used as
first language by a population. For instance, although it originated as
a pidgin, Tok Pisin, official language of New Guinea, is not a pidgin
in linguistic terms, but a creole, a language capable of expressing
the full range of human concerns. Despite their limitations, pidgin
languages represent a useful stopgap measure for communication
between human communities, and their creative use can in fact
express a wide range of information.
We have chosen to model the language of our agents on pidgin
languages for their desirable properties both on the human and the
Xapagy agent side.
• The human side: Xapi should be immediately understandable
to English speakers. Some simple English sentences can be
3immediately translated to Xapi. For other sentences, the missing
grammatical structures can be approximated with workarounds.
Although we make no claim that the full meaning of English
text can be translated to Xapi, many stories as well as interaction
patterns can be captured in a satisfactory manner.
• The computer side: The simplified syntax of Xapi allows us to
bypass the complexities of natural language processing, while
still allowing communication with humans.
Xapi shares some important features with human pidgin languages.
It has an uncomplicated causal structure: the only supported com-
pound statement is the quotation statement. It uses separate words to
indicate degrees of properties. It does not support quantifiers. It has
a fixed word order and no morphophonemic variation (more exactly,
accepts a range of morphophonemic variants as synonyms from the
human speaker, but it does not provide them when generating it from
the computer side1). In addition, it uses sentence part separators (“/”)
and sentence boundary markers (“//”) as a way of circumventing
the necessity of complex text segmentation (which is beyond the
objectives of the Xapagy system).
Xapi is intended to be read and written by humans when communi-
cating with Xapagy agents. It is also used for communication between
Xapagy agents, but it is definitely not a formal agent communication
language.
A line of Xapi text represents a single sentence, with the sentence
parts separated by “/” and terminated with a period “.” or question
mark “?”. Sentences can be of a subject-verb-object form:
1 The boy / hits / the dog.
subject-verb form:
1 The boy / cries.
subject-verb-adjective form:
1 "Hector" / is-a / warrior.
or verb instance-verb-adverb form:
1 "Achilles" / strikes / "Hector".
2 The strikes / action-is / hard.
One or more parts can be substituted with a wh component,
transforming the sentence into a question:
1 Wh / eats / "Little Red Riding Hood"?
Xapi supports a single form of compound sentence, the quotation
sentence:
1 "Little-Red-Riding-Hood" / says / conversation //
2 the eyes / is-a / big.
In some cases, the semantics of other compound or complex
sentences can be approximated by sentences which refer to shared
instances or verb instances. We make, however, no claim that the
expressive power of Xapi matches that of a natural language.
Subjects and objects are instances which are either currently in the
focus, or are newly created by the sentence. A new instance can be
created by prefixing a word with the indefinite article “a/an”:
1 "Billy" / hits / a dog.
In this example we assume Billy has been referred to before, but
the dog has been just introduced in the story. Subsequent references
to the already introduced instance of the dog are prefixed with the
definite article “the” (which can be omitted for proper nouns).
1 The dog / changes / angry.
2 The dog / bites / "Billy".
In pidgin, we refer to instances through one or more of their
attributes. When we mention the attribute [dog], the reference will
be made to the strongest instance in the scene which has the given
attribute. In some cases, such as quotation sentences, the resolution
1In the current version Xapi 3.2.
[man]
[mammal]
[courageous]
[fearless]
[alive][trojan]
["Hector"]
The concept overlay of the Hector instance
Fig. 1. A visualization of concepts, overlap, impact and concept overlays
in the form of patches. Concepts directly added are represented with gray
patches, concepts added through impact are black patches, and concepts which
are implicitly present in the overlay due to their overlap with explicitly added
concepts are represented as transparent contours.
process is performed in a different scene. It is the responsibility of the
speaker to choose attributes which make a reference resolve correctly.
The verb word in a Xapi sentence actually maps to a mixture
(overlay) of verb concepts in the internal representation of the
Xapagy agent. The composition of this verb overlay determines the
relationship between the sentences. For actions such as “hits” or
“bites”, the relationship between the sentences is one of a weak
temporal succession. One can imagine these sentences connected by
“then”: Billy hits the dog, then the dog is angry, then the dog bites
Billy. The relationship is stronger between sentences which share
instances.
We can create verb overlays which convey essentially the same
action but create a stronger succession to the preceding verbs by
adding the word “thus”. This can be used to represent a cause-effect
relationship:
1 "Billy" / hits hard / a dog.
2 The dog / thus changes / angry.
Just like the “dog” in this story is an instance which has as
attributes concepts such as [dog] and [angry], the action “hit”
is a verb instance whose verb part has as attributes the verb concepts
[hit] and [hard].
Finally, there are some sentences which do not represent actions
in time, and thus they are not connected by succession relationships.
Examples are verbs which set attributes to instances:
1 "Hector" / is-a / warrior.
or establish relationships between instances:
1 "Hector" / loves / "Andromache".
B. From words to concepts and verbs
We have seen that the Xapi pidgin uses a simplified syntax, but
otherwise regular English words. The dictionary of the agent maps
nouns and adjectives to overlays of concepts while verbs and adverbs
are mapped to overlays of verb concepts. We will discuss concept
overlays, as the verb overlays are very similar.
An overlay is the simultaneous activation of several concepts with
specific levels of energy. For instance the dictionary of a Xapagy
agent might associate the word “warrior” with the following overlay:
[courageous=0.4, violent=0.3, strong=0.3]
The attributes of an instance are represented by an overlay which
can be gradually extended through the side effects of the sentences.
Thus, when reading the Xapi sentences:
1 "Hector" / is-a / man.
2 "Hector" / is-a / warrior.
the instance identified with the attribute Hector will acquire the
attributes described in the overlay: man, courageous and so on.
4Concepts are internal structures of the Xapagy agent. To distin-
guish them from words, which are external entities, we will always
show them in brackets, such as [warrior].
One way to develop an intuition for concepts and overlays is to
visualize them as patches of a certain area in a fictional two dimen-
sional space. Some concepts have a large area (e.g. [animal]), while
others are smaller (e.g. [dog]). Proper nouns such as ["Hector"]
have a very small area. Overlays can be visualized as collections of
such patches (see Figure 1).
Concepts can overlap on a pair-by-pair basis. For instance,
there is a full overlap between man and human, meaning all men
are human: overlap ([man],[human]) = area ([man]). Thus, if we
inquire whether Hector is human, we shall obtain a value of
1.0. There is, on the other hand, only a partial overlap between
courageous and fearless: overlap ([fearless], [courageous]) =
0.5·area ([courageous]). Thus, is we ask whether Hector is fearless,
the answer will be 0.4 × 0.5 = 0.2.
Words denoting proper nouns, such as “Hector”, marked in pidgin
by quotation marks, are treated slightly differently: when the agent
first encounters a proper noun, it will create a new concept with a
very small area, and an entry in the domain dictionary associating the
proper noun with an overlay containing exclusively the new concept.
Other than this, proper nouns are just like any other attributes. Having
the same proper noun as an attribute does not immediately imply any
form of identity.
The dictionary which maps from a word to an overlay, the areas
and overlap of the concepts are part of the domain knowledge of the
agent. Different agents might have different domain knowledge - thus
the meaning of the word might differ between agents.
C. Instances
The definition of an instance in Xapagy is somewhat different from
the way this term is used in other intelligent systems. Instead of
representing an entity of the real world, it represents an entity of the
story, over a time span limited by the additivity of the attributes. For a
particular instance, its attributes, represented in a form of an overlay
of concepts, are additive: once an instance acquired an attribute, the
attribute remains attached to the instance forever.
The advantage of this definition is that once we have identified an
instance, there is no need for further qualification in order to identify
its attributes (nor its actions).
What might be counter-intuitive for the reader, however, is that
things we colloquially call a single entity are represented in Xapagy
by several instances. Let us, for instance, consider Hector. In the
Iliad, he is a central figure of the story: he appears first as a warrior,
participates in several fights, while later he is killed by Achilles by
a spear to his throat, and the action revolves around the return of
his body to his father, Priam. Hector also appears in the Hollywood
movie “Troy”, but here he is killed with a sword to the chest. In the
science fiction novel “Ilium” by Dan Simmons, Hector is quantum-
recreated by aliens to replay the events in Iliad on the planet Mars. In
the novel, Hector chooses to ally itself with Achilles and the Greeks
against the aliens from an alternate reality who are playing the roles
of the gods.
In the Xapagy system, these are all different instances, which
share the attribute ["Hector"] (but then, that is also shared by
Hector Berlioz, the French composer). These instances, of course,
are connected through various relations of identity (for a discussion
on the philosophical problem of personal identity we refer the reader
to [20], [21]). Such identity relations are represented in Xapagy by
relations among multiple instances, not by sharing the same instance.
The Xapagy system, however, moves a step beyond this. Not only
Hector from the Iliad and Hector from the Ilium are represented by
different instances, but Hector the live warrior and Hector the corpse
in the Iliad are also two different instances, as the change from a
living warrior to a dead one can not be represented as an addition of
attributes.
1 "Achilles" / strikes / "Hector".
2 "Hector" / thus changes / dead.
3 "Achilles" / kicks / "Hector".
The sentence in line 2 will create a new instance, with a new set of
attributes. In addition, it will connect these instances with a somatic
identity relation:
1 i201 ["Hector"] / is-somatically-identical /
2 i101 ["Hector"].
Whenever, at a later time, the Xapagy agent recalls Hector (for
instance, in a conversation) it first needs to establish what instance
is under consideration. Once this instance has been unequivocally
established to be, for instance, the live Hector i101, all the attributes
of the instance are also unambiguously established: we can say that
he is strong, courageous etc., attributes which would not make sense
applied to the dead Hector instance i201.
D. The focus
The focus in the Xapagy system holds instances and verb instances
after their creation for a limited time interval during which they are
changeable. After an instance or verb instance leaves the focus, it
can never return - and thus, it remains unchanged.
Instances in the focus can acquire new attributes, participate as
a subject or object in verb instances and become part of relations.
Verb instances in the focus can become part of succession or
summarization relations, and they can be referred to by new verb
instances.
A visual thinking oriented reader might think about the focus in the
following way: the focus is a dynamically evolving graph. New nodes
(instances and verb instances) are added through various events. The
same events might also create new edges among the nodes of the
focus. When a node leaves the focus, it retains its attributes and
edges, but it can not acquire new ones any more. So the focus can be
seen as the actively growing boundary of a graph which represents
the complete experience of the Xapagy agent. The graph will be only
locally connected: it will not have long links, as only nodes which
have been in the focus together can have links.
To illustrate this graph nature of the focus, let us consider the
following short story:
1 A "Billy" / is-a / boy.
2 A "Jeannie"/ is-a / girl.
3 "Billy" / kissed / the girl.
4 "Jeannie" / pushed / the boy.
5 The boy / laughed.
Running this story through a Xapagy agent, and visualizing the
focus at the end of the story through the Xapagy system’s GraphViz
based output, we obtain Figure 2. Such a graphical output provides
an insight in the complexity of the focus, but it makes for a difficult
reading. Thus, in the reminder of the paper, we shall mostly rely on
text based illustrations of the internal structures (see Appendix A for
some of the typographical conventions we shall use).
E. Shadows
Instances and verb instances leaving the focus will be demoted to
the memory of the Xapagy agent with a certain level of salience. They
will never enter the focus again. On the other hand, each instance
and verb instance in the focus has a shadow, a weighted collection
of instances and, respectively, verb instances from the memory.
The shadows are maintained through a combination of techniques
whose goal is to make the shadows consistent between each other and
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Fig. 2. Example of the focus after the boy-kisses-girl story.
match the ongoing story with the collections of stories in the shadows.
To ensure the matching of the stories, the shadows sometimes need
to forego the individual matching level between the instances. Let us
consider that a Xapagy agent which had read about the duel between
Hector and Patrocles:
1 "Hector" / cuts / "Patrocles".
2 The greek / thus changes / dead.
Several days later, he resumes reading the Iliad and reads:
1 "Achilles" / strikes / "Hector".
We already know that the two instances of Hector will not be the
same: the days passed before resuming the story will be more than
enough to remove the instance from the focus. Yet, the two instances
will have a lot of common attributes: Hector, Trojan, warrior.
Yet the overall shape of the current fight will lead to a different
shadowing: the strongest element in the shadow of Hector will be
the previous instance of Patrocles, while the shadow of Achilles will
contain the previous instance of Hector. The Achilles-strikes-Hector
verb instance will be shadowed by the Hector-cuts-Patrocles verb
instance.
Shadows are always matched to instances and verb instances in the
focus. The verb instances in shadows, however, bring with themselves
verb instances to which they are connected through succession,
precedence and summarization relations. These verb instances can
be clustered into weighted sets which are very similar to shadows,
but they are not connected to current focus components. These sets
are called headless shadows and they represent outlines of events
which the agent either expect to happen in the future or assume that
they had already happened but have not been witnessed (or they are
missing from the narration). If an event matching the headless shadow
happens, the two are combined to become a regular focus-component
/ shadow pair.
Shadowing is the fundamental reasoning mechanism of the Xapagy
architecture. All the higher level narrative reasoning methods rely on
the maintenance of the shadows. For instance, the Xapagy agent can
predict the death of Hector through the shadow, and can express
surprise if this does not happen. While in this example the shadow is
created after the events are inserted into the focus from an external
source (for instance, by reading), the opposite is also possible. In the
case of recall, narration, or confabulation, the agent creates instances
and verb instances in the focus based on pre-existing shadows.
With this, we conclude our informal introduction of the Xapagy
architecture. The remainder of the paper will present a more detailed
description of how these components are implemented.
III. THE PRIMITIVE COMPONENTS OF THE ARCHITECTURE
A. Random identifiers
The Xapagy system operates by adding verb instances (continu-
ously) and instances (occasionally) to the focus. The need for new
instances is fulfilled by a generator which supplies a continuous
flow of random identifiers. When a new instance or verb instance
is needed, the Xapagy agent picks the current identifier from the
continuous flow, and introduces it into the focus.
Identifiers which will become instances are decorated with at-
tributes in the form of a concept overlay, and can participate in
relationships appropriate for instances (such as ownership, group
membership and scene participation). Identifiers which become verb
instances are decorated with attributes in form of a verb concept
overlay, can participate in sentence part relationships (subject, object
and so on), and can be parts of relationships between verb instances
(succession and summarization).
The identifiers do not carry meaning. However, for the purpose of
debugging or illustration we can force the random generator to create
descriptive identifiers. In this paper, for easier readability, identifiers
such as i001, i002... will represent instances while v001, v002 ...
will represent verb instances. When describing several consecutive
stories, we shall jump with 100 in the count of identifiers for every
new story.
B. Concepts and overlays
A concept in Xapagy is the representation of an undivisible
attribute. A weighted superposition of concepts is called a concept
overlay (CO). When talking about concepts in general, we will denote
concepts with c1, c2 . . . and COs as C1, C2 . . .. For specific concepts
we will use descriptive names in brackets such as [man]. For
specific overlays, we list the participating concepts inside brackets,
if necessary, specifying the explicit energy level of each concept in
the overlay.
The specificity of a concept is characterized by its area: area(c) ∈
R+. The more specific a concept is, the smaller its area. We will
assign an area of 1.0 to the concepts corresponding to the basic
objects of the hierarchy in the sense described in Rosch et. al. [23].
For instance, some areas used in our experiments are:
area([wolf]) = 1.0
area(["Hector"]) = 0.1
area([animal]) = 3.0
area([thing]) = 10.0
6In the following, we introduce formulas for the calculation of the
energy level of specific concepts in overlays. To simplify the formulas
we will define a trimming function as follows:
trim(x, y) =

0 if x < 0
x if x ∈ [0, y]
y if x > y
(1)
where we will omit y when its value is 1.
Overlays are built iteratively, by adding one concept at a time,
starting with an empty overlay. We start by defining the explicit
energy of concept c in overlay C as een(C, c) < area(c). In the
empty overlay, the explicit energy of all concepts is zero, for non-
empty overlays, the explicit energy is determined recursively by the
formulas defining the addition operation.
We will define the explicit energy of the overlay as the sum of the
explicit energies of all the concepts in the overlay:
een(C) =
∑
c
een(C, c) (2)
We define two addition operations, differentiated by whether they
consider or not the impact of the concepts.
The direct addition ⊕ is a simple summation of the explicit energy,
limited by the area of the concepts, and is defined through the
following formulas:
C′ = C ⊕ {c, e} ⇒
een(C′, c) = trim(een(C, c) + e, area(c))
∀cx 6= c een(C′, cx) = een(C, cx) (3)
The second, impacted addition operation  also considers the
impact between concepts. Adding a concept c1 with energy e through
this operation automatically triggers the addition of a number of
other concepts, with an energy proportional with e, defined by the
value impact(c1, c2) which has the dimensionality of a positive or
negative ratio. The impact is not necessarily symmetrical and it can
be negative.
The impacted addition operation  is defined through the formulas:
C′ = C  {c, e} ⇒
een(C′, c) = trim(een(C, c) + e, area(c))
∀cx 6= c een(C′, cx) =
trim(een(C, cx) + e · impact(c, cx), area(cx)) (4)
The explicit energy of a concept in an overlay is the energy we
explicitly added either through direct addition or through impact.
Another way through which a concept can have energy in an
overlay is through overlapping a concept which has explicit energy.
The overlap between two concepts ci and cj is defined in the dimen-
sionality of the area overlap(ci, cj) ∈ R+. The overlap is always
smaller than the area or either concept area(ci) ≥ overlap(ci, cj)
and it is symmetrical ∀i∀j overlap(ci, cj) = overlap(cj , ci). If two
concept’s areas are identical and their overlap is identical with the
area, the two concepts are indistinguishable, and thus are considered
equivalent:
area(c1) = area(c2) = overlap(c1, c2)
def
==⇒ c1 ≡ c2 (5)
We define the energy of concept c in overlay C conservatively by:
en(C, c) =
max
(
area(c), een(C, c) +
max
cx 6=c
(
overlap(cx, c) · een(C, cx)
area(cx)
))
(6)
The advantage of this conservative metric (i.e. relying on a max
rather than a sum) is that the areas shared by three or more concepts
do not need to be considered, as they do not enter into the calculation
of the energy levels of the individual concepts in an overlay.
For a certain overlay C and concept c we can define the activation
act(C, c) ∈ [0, 1] of the concept in the overlay with:
act(C, c) =
en(C, c)
area(c)
(7)
Having defined the formulas governing concepts and COs, let us
investigate the intuitions behind them. The definition of a concept
and related terms in Xapagy does not map to scientific classification,
computational logic, descriptive logic, or the possible worlds inter-
pretation. The Xapagy system, in its current version, can not model
these abstractions2.
Roughly, Xapagy concepts cover the categories of nouns and
adjectives of classical grammar. There is no notion of a “class”
or “type” in Xapagy: there are only instances which happen to
share certain attributes. A man is simply a random identifier which
happened to have the attribute [man].
The area of a concept, as we said is a metric of its specificity - more
general concepts have a larger area. However, we should caution the
reader against pushing the analogy between this metric and the area
of two-dimensional shapes too far. For instance, we can not assume
that the sum of the areas of the different animal types will be the
area of the concept [animal].
In a similar vein, Xapagy verbs cover both the categories of
verbs and adverbs of classical grammar. A certain verb word in
a sentence maps to an overlay of attributes. An interesting future
research direction could be to investigate the relationship between
this composition model and Pinker’s microfeatures [22].
C. Negation
For each concept c we automatically define its negation −c. When
we write out the name of the concept, such as in [alive], we shall
write the negation as [not-alive]. The negated concept is defined
by its specific impact and overlap with reference to other concepts.
impact(c1,−c1) = impact(−c1, c1) = −1
overlap(c1, c2) = overlap(−c1,−c2)
impact(c1, c2) = impact(−c1,−c2) (8)
The negation defined in Xapagy does not follow logical (or
arithmetical) rules of negation. The concept [alive] does not stand
for all the instances which are alive, nor [not-alive] stay for all
the other instances.
The definition of the negation, however, is designed to serve the
needs of narrative reasoning, and most of the times yields results
consistent with the commonsense interpretation:
1 "Hector" / is-a / warrior.
2 He / is-a / alive.
3 "Hector" / changes / not-alive.
The new instance of Hector will have the attributes
[Hector, not-alive], the [alive] attribute being removed
by the negative impact of the [not-alive] concept3.
2If such abstractions must become part of the narrative, they need to be
modeled in the story itself.
3We can, of course, define a Xapi word “dead” which maps to
[not-alive].
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D. Verbs and verb overlays
The Xapagy system treats verbs very similarly to concepts.
A verb or verb concept in Xapagy is the representation of an
undivisible attribute of an action or event. A weighted superposi-
tion of verbs is called a verb overlay (VO). When talking about
verbs in general, we will denote them with v1, v2 . . . and VOs as
VC1,VC2 . . .. For specific verbs we will use descriptive names in
brackets such as [hits]. The formulas introduced for COs will hold
for VOs as well.
In contrast to concepts which are fully defined by their overlays and
impacts, Xapagy defines a group of special meta-verbs which, when
activated in the focus, trigger side-effects, in the form of modifying
the focus and creating relations between instances / verb instances.
More detail about meta-verbs will be provided in Section V-D.
E. Instances, attributes and relations
An instance is formed by a random identifier and the associated
CO. Instances are created whenever a new entity appears in the
ongoing narration, or whenever an existing entity was changed such
that the additivity of the CO can not be maintained. The source of
the instance can be external (when witnessing or reading a story) or
internal (when recalling or confabulating a story). Figure 3 describes
the life cycle of an instance.
In Xapi sentences, the creation of a new instance can be triggered
by making a reference prefixed with an article a/an. This triggers the
creation of a verb instance with the meta-verb [create-instance],
which creates the new instance and immediately initializes its CO
with the attributes through which the reference has been made.
1 A man / exists.
The attributes of the concept can be changed in the future through
[is-a] sentences, which enact an impacted addition :
1 The man / is-a / "Hector".
2 "Hector" / is-a / courageous.
The attributes of the instance are permanently attached to the
identifier and they are strictly additive. Addition of new attributes
is supported only to the extent that no significant negative impacts
are exercised over the existing attributes. The only way we can turn
Hector into a coward is through a [change] action:
1 "Hector" / changes / coward.
This operation, however, creates a new instance, which inherits a
copy of the attributes of Hector, with the appropriate new concepts
(and their impacts) applied. The old instance is immediately demoted
to memory.
TABLE I
THE VERB INSTANCE TYPES AND THEIR MANDATORY PARTS
Type Verb SubI ObjI SubVI ObjCO ObjVO
S-V-O x x x - - -
S-V x x - - - -
S-ADJ x - - - x -
S-ADV x - - - - x
IND x x x - - x
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F. Verb instances
A verb instance (VI) is composed of a random identifier and a
number of mandatory relationships to its parts. Parts can be instances,
VIs, COs or VOs. Table I describes the verb instance types and
their mandatory parts. We can refer to the parts of a VI through
a functional notation: for instance SubI(V ) is the subject instance
of VI V . The only part shared by all VIs is the VerbVO(V), the
verbs. The composition of this VO determines the type of the verb
instance. For instance, the presence of the verb [is-a] implies a
type of S-ADJ.
Figure 4 describes the life cycle of a VI. Most VIs are instantiated
from Xapi statements. Those parts which refer to existing instances or
VI are determined through the reference resolution process (see Sec-
tion VII-B). The source of the verb instances is either external (from
observation of ongoing events or reading/listening to a narration) or
internal (from recall or confabulation).
IV. FOCUS AND SHADOWS
A. Terminology and notation
To simplify this presentation, let us start by several definitions. We
define a weighted set of instances IS by saying that the participation
of instance I in instance set IS is a value w(IS, I) ∈ [0, 1]. In contrast
to COs, where concepts have impact and overlap, instance sets deal
with independent and non-interacting instances.
The primary operation of instance sets is the ratio-add:
∀r ∈ R IS = IS1 + r · IS2 ⇔
∀I w(IS, I) = trim (w(IS1, I) + r · w(IS2, I)) (9)
Verb instance sets VS are defined analogously.
The state of a Xapagy agent is modified by two kind of activities:
spike activities (SA) and diffusion activities (DA).
SAs are instantaneous operations on overlays and weighted sets.
Examples of activities modeled by SAs include inserting an instance
in the focus, inserting a verb instance in the focus, and enacting the
side effects of a verb instance. SAs are not parallel: the Xapagy agent
executes a single SA at a time.
DAs represent gradual changes in the weighted sets; the output
depends on the amount of time the diffusion was running. Multiple
DAs run in parallel, reciprocally influencing each other. As a prac-
tical matter the Xapagy system implements DAs through sequential
8discrete simulation, with a temporal resolution an order of magnitude
finer grained than the arrival rate of VIs.
B. Story following and the focus
The focus is the collection of instances and VIs currently active
in the Xapagy agent. Instances and VIs in the focus are changeable:
they can acquire attributes, and they can enter into new relations.
Once an instance or VI leaves the focus (is demoted to the memory)
it will not change, except through a gradual decay.
The focus can be seen as two weighted sets of instances ISF and
VIs VSF respectively. The focus is maintained through a number of
SAs and DAs. In the following description we will list the SAs and
DAs in an informal manner. The exact formulas are beyond the scope
of this paper.
Let us start by listing the activities which affect the instances of the
focus ISF . We will prefix their descriptions with S and D depending
on whether it is spike or a diffusion activity, and with +, - or +/-
depending on their effects of the participations in ISF .
(S+) instances are added at full participation at their creation.
(D-) in absence of other factors, the participation of instances decays
in time.
(S+) instances referenced by newly created VIs are reinforced.
(D+) reinforcement on instances transfers part of the reinforcement
to instances which are in a relation with the instance.
(D-) forced decay on instances transfers part of the decay to instances
which are in relation to the decayed instance.
(S-) instances on which the change procedure has been performed
are decayed to zero and removed from the focus.
The weighted set of VIs in the focus VSF represents, informally
speaking, recent verb instances which are still relevant to the inter-
pretation of current events. In general, the older a VI, the less likely
to be still in focus. In practice, this is somewhat more complex than
a gradually decaying tail of recent events, as the nature of the event
changes the speed at which the VI fades from the focus. Non-action
verbs, such as is-a will fade from the focus very quickly, action
verbs tend to linger until they have acquired a sufficient number of
successors while summarization verbs remain until they are a current
summary and then fade out when they acquired sufficient successors.
Let us now summarize the activities which positively or negatively
affect the participation of the verb instances in the focus:
(S+) VIs are added at full participation when created.
(D-) in absence of other factors, VIs decay at a speed dependent on
their verbs.
(S-) VIs decay with every establishment of the successor relationship.
(S+) the participation of the summary verbs is increased by every
matching VI added to the focus.
(S-) the [is-single-scene] verb decays all the current VIs from
the focus.
When the participation of an instance or VI falls below a threshold,
the instance or VI is removed from the focus. While there are several
ways through which an instance might be reinforced in the focus, for
a non-summary VI the only question is how quickly it will fade
away. While instances and summarization VIs can (theoretically)
stay indefinitely in the focus, non-summarization VIs will leave quite
quickly.
C. Shadows
Instances and VIs which have been demoted to memory can affect
the current state of the agent by shadowing the focus. Each instance
(or VI) in the focus is the head of a an associated instance set (or
verb instance set) called the body of the shadow. The shadows are
maintained such that their components reflect the previous experience
of the agent with respect to the ongoing narration.
Shadows are dynamic and maintained by a number of activities:
(S+) The addition of an unexpected instance or VI creates a corre-
sponding empty shadow.
(S+) The addition of an expected instance or VI creates a new shadow
from the headless shadow which predicted the instance (for more
detail see Section VIII-B).
(D-) In the absence of other factors, all the shadows decay in time.
The energy released in this DA is added to the energy of the
environment.
(D+) Matching the head: instances from memory which match the
shadow head will be strengthened in the shadow body. The
energy for this DA comes from the environment.
(D+) Matching the shadow body: instances from memory which
match the shadow body will be strengthened in the shadow body.
The energy for this DA comes from the environment.
(D+/-) Consistency: the participation of the VI in a shadow and the
participation of its parts in the shadows of the corresponding
parts of the shadow head gradually moves towards a common
average value.
(D+/-) Instance identity sharpening: if an in-memory instance par-
ticipates in multiple shadows, the strong participations will
be gradually reinforced, while the weak participations will be
further weakened. The operation is energy neutral for a given
memory instance.
(D+/-) Non-identity: if a shadow contains instances which are con-
nected through the non-identity relation4, the instance with
the stronger participation is reinforced while the instance with
the weaker participation is weakened. The operation is energy
neutral for a given non-identity pair.
instances which appear as different verb parts are guaranteed
that they are not identical. This DA decreases the participation
of weaker non-identical instances in the same shadow body. The
operation is energy neutral based on a per / shadow body bases.
The shadow maintenance activities (and the closely related head-
less shadow maintenance activities controlling the narrative reason-
ing), are self-regulating, encompassing elements of negative feedback
as well as resource limitation.
For instance, the head matching activity will not create an indefi-
nitely large shadow even if the shadow head is very general, as the
shadow instance set is “fed” from a limited set of resources, and once
the shadow had grown beyond a certain size, its growth will slow.
Such interactions apply even between the activities. If a shadow
is small, because there are few memory items matching its head, it
can be extended by matching the shadow body, which brings in more
remotely related items than the head match.
V. CORE KNOWLEDGE
Problem domain knowledge appears in the Xapagy architecture in
three forms:
- Dictionary knowledge includes the knowledge of the words
in the Xapi language and the way they map to COs and
VOs. Xapagy agents do not need domain specific grammatical
knowledge, as the pidgin grammar is very simple and rigidly
fixed.
4The non-identity relation is explicitly created for distinct instances in the
same story line. For example, Achilles is non-identical to the instance of
Hector with which it is currently fighting. However, Achilles is not non-
identical with Lancelot.
9- Conceptual knowledge is encoded in the properties of concepts
and verbs. This includes their areas, overlaps, impacts and, for
a small number of meta-verbs, the side effects of the verbs.
- Episodic knowledge covers the stories previously witnessed, read
or confabulated by the agent. The stories are represented by the
interconnected network of VIs and instances in the memory.
A Xapagy agent acquires dictionary and conceptual knowledge by
loading knowledge description files in the Xapagy domain knowledge
language. This very simple, human editable language allows the
specification of the dictionary, the concepts and verbs together with
their impacts and overlaps. The agent can save its dictionary and
concept knowledge in the same format.
While the knowledge of Xapagy agents vary in all three domains
(dictionary, conceptual and episodic), we assume that they share
a common core of basic knowledge encoded in the Xapagy Do-
main Knowledge Library. The current presentation covers Xapagy
CoreDKL version 0.20. We assume that the representations in this
library are shared by all Xapagy agents. The CoreDKL only con-
tains conceptual and dictionary knowledge. The agents share basic
concepts and even elements of language, but they do not, by default,
share remembrances of stories.
To reason about other problem domains, the agent can load
other problem domain definitions. For instance, the Iliad library
contains descriptions of words such as warrior or sword, as well as
fighting related verbs. The LittleRedRidingHood domain contains
definitions for hood, basket and wolf. Both domains rely upon and
therefore load the Human library which provides definitions for words
such as human, man, woman, alive and dead.
The reminder of this section discusses some of the functionality
defined in the CoreDKL.
A. Scenes
A scene in Xapagy is a partition of the reference space. Every
Xapi sentence resolves its references inside a single scene, which
needs to be resolved before the resolution starts. From this modus
operandi follows that for VIs created from Xapi, only instances which
are members of the same scene can interact with each other.
A scene does not necessarily correspond to a physical location, and
the mechanical rules of interaction do not always apply. For instance,
a conversation, either face-to-face or through remote means such as
by phone, is a scene. If an agent talks to a friend in a restaurant, while
being on the phone with another, it will be simultaneously part of
three scenes: two non-physical conversation scenes, and the physical
scene of the room, including the furniture, food, his friend and other
customers.
Scenes are implemented as relations between the scene instance (an
arbitrary instance which has the [scene] attribute) and the instances
which are considered to be in the scene. An instance can be part of
multiple scenes.
There is current scene in the focus. Newly created instances will
be part of the current scene. Other scenes can be created as any other
instance. The current instance is set with the [is-current-scene]
verb. The statement:
1 A forest scene / is-current-scene.
creates a new scene with the attribute forest, and makes it the current
scene. Previous scenes will be retained, although they will gradually
expire from the focus. If we want to expire from the focus all the
previous scenes, it can be done with the [is-only-scene] verb:
1 A forest scene / is-only-scene.
All the newly created instances will automatically become part of
the current scene.
1 A forest scene / is-only-scene.
2 A "Little-Red-Riding-Hood" / is-a / girl.
3 The girl / has / a red hood.
4 The girl / has / a basket.
At this moment, the scene will contain the girl, the hood and the
basket. An instance can leave the scene through the [leave-scene]
verb:
1 The wolf / leaves-scene.
Instances which are not part of any scene but are still in the focus
are considered to be part of the limbo scene. At reference resolution,
the limbo scene is searched after the current scene, allowing it to
move instances from one scene to another.
1 A house / is-current-scene.
2 The wolf / enters-scene.
Scenes determine the reference space where a particular reference
is made:
• a reference to a scene is resolved among the scenes in the focus.
• a reference to an entering instance is resolved in the context of
the limbo scene.
• a reference in a quote verb instance is resolved in the scene
determined in the inquit.
• in all other cases, the reference is resolved in the context of the
current scene.
B. Groups
The concept of a group in Xapagy allows us to have VIs where
the subject or the object is a collection of entities. Groups are
implemented as instances which have the special attribute [group],
and they can be in a composition relation with a number of other
instances. Instances can be part of more than one group and they can
join and leave groups dynamically.
An explicit group is a group of individually known instances:
1 An explicit group / exists.
2 The group / contains / Billy.
3 The group / is-joined-by / "Johnny".
The side effects of most meta-verbs distribute over the members
of explicit groups. For instance, we can remove all the members of
the group from the current scene by saying:
1 The group / leaves-scene.
In the case of implicit groups the elements are not enumerated:
1 A group / exists.
2 The group / is-a / many man.
An implicit group can still have explicit members:
1 The group / contains / "Johnny".
At this moment, we have a crowd of people, out of which we
recognize Johnny.
C. Ownership-type relations
Let us call ownership-type relations the multitude of complex
relations commonly expressed in English with the word “has”. As
Xapi does not support polysemantic words, the different relations
must be represented in Xapagy by different words (and of course,
different VOs).
The current version of core domain knowledge defines three
distinct concepts [holds], [legally-owns] and [is-part-of]5,
mapped to similarly named words:
1 "Little-Red-Riding-Hood" / holds / a basket.
2 "Mary" / legally-owns / a little lamb.
3 A big eye / is-part-of / the wolf.
5The [contains] verb of group membership discussed in the previous
section is a close relative.
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Ownership-type relations can change frequently as a result of
sentences which mix in the VO the verb for the creation (or negation)
of the relation, the meta-verbs for denoting an action verb and one
or more verbs describing the nature of the action:
1 "Johnny" / holds / a ball.
2 "Johnny" / drops / the ball.
3 "Billy" / picks-up / the ball.
For instance, the word “drops” is mapped to [drops not-holds
succ*]. Johnny can, of course get rid of the ball in a different way
as well:
1 "Johnny" / puts-down / a ball.
where “puts-down” is mapped to [drops not-holds succ*]. Due
to the limitations of the Xapi language (as well as the VI structure),
the English statement “Billy gives the ball to Johnny” must be
expressed as two Xapi statements (whose tight coupling is enforced
by the “thus” word):
1 "Billy" / gives / the ball.
2 "Johnny" / thus receives / the ball.
One can consider this as the extreme case of the situation when
Billy puts down the ball and, after a while, Johnny picks it up. This
is an example of those cases where the limitations of the language
can be addressed through a workaround involving instances shared
among multiple VIs.
D. Verb instance types as determined by meta-verbs
The side effects of a VI are determined by the meta-verbs
participating in the VO their verb part. Although technically any
combination of verbs and meta-verbs is possible, in practice most
VIs can be classified in three classes, recognizable by their meta-
verbs: action VIs, attribute accumulation VIs and relation creation
VIs. These classes differ in their side effects as well as the amount
of time they spend in the focus.
Action VIs represent actions or events which are part of the chain
of a developing story. This is represented by the fact that they
are connected by succession relations to their predecessors and by
summarization relations to VIs which summarize them.
As action VIs need to be connected to their successors, they need
to stay in the focus for a longer amount of time. Their participation
in the focus is decreasing slowly, but it is reduced, in the form of
a SA by the establishment of a succession relation: action VIs are
pushed out by their successors.
There are two kinds of attribute accumulation VIs. One of them
impacts instances by adding new attributes with the meta-verb
[is-a], while the other one impacts VIs by adding new verbs with
the meta-verb [action-is]. Unless an attribute accumulation VI is
also an action VI, it will expire very quickly from the focus (and in
consequence, it will also have a low salience in the memory).
Relation-creation VIs (always of type S-V-O) embody a relation
among instances in the focus. This type of VIs never expire from the
focus as long as the represented instances are present. They can be,
however, pushed out from the focus by other relation creation VIs.
Each verb in the VO can bring its own side effects which are
implemented as an SA. The spike is normally triggered at the moment
when the VI is inserted in the focus, although some type of insertions,
such as for questions, inhibit the side effects.
E. The succession chain
The succession relation is established between a predecessor VI
and a successor VI when a new action VI is inserted into the
focus. The SA activated at the insertion of verb instance Vn creates
succession relations relations between Vn and all the VIs V in the
focus, the strength of the relation given by:
"Billy" / puts / a nail.
"Billy" / hits / the nail.
"Billy" / smiles.
"Billy" / hits / the nail.
"Billy" / hits / the nail.
"Billy" / repeatedly hits / the nail.
Fig. 5. Summarization of a repetitive action. Arrows with solid lines are
successor relations, while arrows with interrupted lines are summarization
relations.
rs(Vn, V ) = σ · (w ·M(Vn, V ) + 1− w) · focus(V )r (10)
The matching relation M(Vn, V ) takes the value 1 if V and Vn
have at least one common part, and 0 otherwise. The balancing factor
w defines whether succession relations are established only with VIs
which share parts with the new VI (w = 1), with all VIs in the focus
(w = 0) or intermediary values.
The value σ is the strength of SA. The parameter r modulates the
strength in function of the recentness of the links. If r >> 1 the link
is connected only to the most recent VIs (for instance, in the case of
the word “thus”).
F. Summarization relationships
Action statements represent individual actions or events whose
timespan is measured over the course of seconds. Repetitive or
continuous actions are summarized by summarization VIs.
Figure 5 shows an example of the summarization process (the
VIs are illustrated with the corresponding Xapi statement). The left
column of VIs are created by direct observation, while the VI in the
right is created by the summarization process. The summarization
VI is created when the second “hits” verb instance is issued. As
long as the ongoing VIs inserted in the focus match the current
summarization VIs, they will be linked to the current summarization
VI.
Like other VIs, summarization VIs will participate in succession
and summarization relations. This allows future recall processes to
recall some stories in more details than others.
Multiple summarization VIs can be active simultaneously in the
focus. Some of them might be summaries over VIs which are
themselves summaries.
An additional complexity of summarization involves group actions.
In the Figure 5 the summarization verb instance is simply a repetitive
version of the ongoing verb instances which point to the same
instances as subject and object.
However, we can summarize series of hits, kicks, blows and strikes
exchanged between Hector and Achilles with a statement saying that
“the two warriors were fighting”. That is, the series of S-V-O verb
instances are summarized by an S-V verb instance, there the subject
part is a group instance.
There is only incipient support in the current version of the Xapagy
system for this type of reasoning, thus the detailed discussion of the
approach is beyond the scope of this paper.
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G. Creation of instances
The meta-verb [create-instance] creates a new instance with a
specified set of attributes and adds a relationship that the new instance
is a participant in the scene.
1 Scene / create-instance / attribute-list.
In most cases, this kind of statement does not need to be explicitly
issued in Xapi, because it is automatically created as a side effect
whenever an a/an article is used. The statement is created explicitly
by the recall mechanism. If the recall is verbalized, the verbalization
component might roll the instance creation into the sentence where
the new instance is first referred to.
H. Additive composition of attributes
An instance can acquire a new attribute by impact-adding to the
CO associated with the instance, another CO described in S-ADJ type
VI. This functionality is the side effect of the [is-a] verb:
1 "Hector" / is-a / warrior.
The general assumption about Xapagy instances is that they reflect
a story entity with an unchanging set of attributes. The continuous
addition of attributes through [is-a] is, thus, considered to be an act
of discovery, not a recording of change. The added attributes should
not have a negative impact on the existing set.
If a real change in the attributes is what we want to record, this
must be done through the [change] verb, which creates a new
instance).
Similar considerations apply to the VIs, whose verb part can
acquired new attributes through an S-ADV type verb, as a side effect
of the [action-is] verb:
1 "Achilles" / strikes / "Hector".
2 The strikes / action-is / hard.
I. Creation of a new instance through change
If the story entity had changed its attributes (lost existing ones or
acquired new ones) in a manner not consistent with the discovery of
a previously unknown but existing attribute, the Xapagy agent must
represent it through the creation of a new instance6.
This functionality is implemented with the [changes] verb:
1 "Hector" / changes / dead.
a new instance is created, which acquires the previous attributes
of Hector (including the proper noun “Hector”), to which the
[not-alive] concept is impact added, triggering a number of
negative and positive impacts (e.g. the removal of the [alive]
concept from its attributes). At the same time, the initial instance
is immediately retired from the focus and a relation of type
[is-somatically-identical] is created between the old and new
instances7.
The side effects of the verb [changes] are described by the
following SAs:
(S+) the creation of the new instance, with a set of attributes obtained
by the impact-add from the attributes of the old instance
(S+) creation of the [is-somatically-identical] relation be-
tween the old instance and the new one
(S+) creation of scene membership relations to mirror the scene
memberships of the existing instance
6As the creation of a new instance involves simply picking a random
identifier from the existing flow, the creation of an instance does not incur
any cost in the Xapagy model.
7Somatical identity, in the philosophy of personal identity represents the
identity following the “body” of the entity. This is to be contrasted to the
psychological identity which maintains the continuity of the memory (for
entities for which this is relevant).
(S-) expire from the focus all the scene membership relations of the
old instance
(S-) expire the old instance from the focus
J. Destroying an instance
Certain real-world actions such as eating, drinking, or dissolving
lead to the disappearance of that entity as an identifiable part of
the scene. If this entity was mapped to a Xapagy instance, the
instance can not be destroyed, as instances and their attributes are
unchangeable. The real world destroying operation is echoed in the
Xapagy agent through the removal of the instance from the focus and
the scenes.
This can be implemented through the [destroy] meta-verb,
which is part of the VOs associated with words such as “eats”,
“drinks” or “swallows”.
1 "Billy" / eats / an apple.
On the other hand many operations which informally are denoted
as destruction, are in the Xapagy parlance not a destroy operation
but change:
1 "Billy" / drops / the bottle.
2 The bottle / changes / numerous-group glass shards.
K. Representing questions
A question in Xapagy is a verb instance which is partially
unspecified and it can form an answer relationship to VIs which
match the question.
These VIs answering questions might already be in the focus, or
they might be created on demand by the headless shadow mechanism.
There is no requirement that there be a single answer to a question.
Some questions might not be answered (not even attempted to be
answered) or one might have multiple answers to the same question.
In general, the overall flow of the question / answer mechanism is
beyond the scope of this paper. Here we shall only discuss the nature
and specification of the question VIs.
The Xapagy CoreDKL defines a special verb [wh] and a cor-
responding special concept [wh] which, as part of a VO or CO
respectively, turns the VI part into an unspecified one. Any VI which
has at least one unspecified part is a question:
1 Johnny / wh cries?
2 Wh boy / cries?
3 Billy / hits / wh boy?
4 Wh / eats / "Little Red Riding Hood"?
5 Wh / wh / wh?
The wh marker marks the unspecified component of the question.
All the verb instances marked above are questions, irregardless which
component of the verb instance was marked with ”wh”. Once a VI
has been marked as a question, it will inhibit the side effects of its
verb (even if the verb itself is not marked with wh).
As the words in Xapagy map to VOs and COs, we can define
specific words for frequently occurring combinations of [wh] and
other concepts or verbs, such as “who” → [wh human], or “where”
→ [wh place].
L. Representing a conversation
Xapagy defines as conversation the exchange of communicative
acts between two entities in a story. One can represent an exchange
of words without understanding the meaning of the communication.
In this case, no additional knowledge is needed beyond the definition
of the communicative acts themselves (“say”, “ask” and so on).
If, however, we understand the content of the communication, we
need a method to simultaneously represent the communicative act
and the meaning of the communication.
12
The exhaustive discussion of the communication models is beyond
the scope of this paper. We will illustrate the representation through
one example, the famous exchange between the wolf and Little Red
Riding Hood.
We are considering the external view of the story: that is, the case
of a Xapagy agent reading the Grimm brothers translated to Xapi.
The understanding proceeds from the point of view of the Xapagy
agent: it does not require the wolf and the girl to be Xapagy agents.
The representation requires two scenes. The physical scene is the
house of grandma - this is where the communcation will take place.
The other scene, the conversation scene is a virtual scene where the
meaning of the conversation is interpreted, and as such is marked
with the [conversation] attribute.
The wolf and the girl are discussing about issues relevant to
the current moment and themselves, thus they are part of both the
physical and the conversation scene. This is not a requirement: if
they would talk about the Iliad, the conversation scene would contain
Hector and Achilles, but not the conversing parties.
The utterances of the conversation will be represented as quotation-
type sentences, where the inquit is resolved in the physical scene,
while the quote is resolved in the conversation scene. This being a
quote sentence, the special resolution rules apply for “you”, “me”
and so on (see Section VII-B).
Putting it all together, the conversation between the girl and the
wolf is translated to Xapi as follows:
1 A scene house / is-current-scene.
2 The wolf / enters-scene.
3 "Little-Red-Riding-Hood" / enters-scene.
4 A scene conversation / exists.
5 "Little-Red-Riding-Hood"/ enters / conversation.
6 The wolf / enters / conversation.
7 "Little-Red-Riding-Hood" / says / conversation //
8 Eyes / is-part-of / you.
9 "Little-Red-Riding-Hood" / asks / conversation //
10 Eyes / wh is-a / big?
11 Wolf / answers / conversation //
12 Eyes / see good / you.
13 "Little-Red-Riding-Hood" / says / conversation //
14 I / changes / afraid.
15 The wolf / swallows / "Little-Red-Riding-Hood".
M. Representing a narration
A narration is a special case of conversation, which contains
repetitive communicative acts by a narrator. The narration scene does
not normally overlap with the current scene:
1 A scene "Smyrna" / is-current-scene.
2 A man / is-a / "Homer".
3 A scene "Iliad" / exists.
4 Scene "Iliad" / is-before / scene "Smyrna".
5 "Homer" / says / "Iliad" //
6 A man / is-a / "Achilles".
7 "Homer" / says / "Iliad" //
8 "Achilles" / is-a / angry.
In this sample, the man Homer, in his birthplace Smyrna starts
the narration of the Iliad. Line 4 defines the temporal relationship
between the scenes, i.e. establishing the fact that scene of Iliad
happens in the past of the narration. The specification of such a
relation is optional. Furthermore, it is possible to place a narration
in the future. For instance, describing the prophecy made by Calchas
we need to position it in the scene which is in the future:
1 Scene "Iliad" / is-before /
2 scene "ProphecyOfCalchas".
An agent can narrate a past (or future) story in which itself partic-
ipates - but it will need to represent itself with another instance, with
which it would establish some kind of identity relation (for instance,
somatic identity). Let us see an example of Achilles narrating its own
story at the Greek camp:
1 A greek camp scene / is-current-scene.
2 A man / is-a / "Achilles".
3 A scene "Remembrance" / is-before / scene camp.
4 "Achilles" / says / "Remembrance" //
5 A man / is-a / "Achilles".
6 "Achilles" / says / "Remembrance" //
7 I / somatically-identical / "Achilles".
8 "Achilles" / says / "Remembrance" //
9 "Achilles" / kills / "Hector".
VI. EPISODIC KNOWLEDGE
After a minute or so, he goes out to join Doug, who is
ritualistically lighting up a cigar. “This is a good time to
smoke,” he mumbles. “Want one?”
“Sure. Thanks.” Randy pulls out a folding multipurpose
tool and cuts the end from the cigar, a pretty impressive
looking Cuban number. “Why do you say it’s a good time
to smoke?”
“To fix it in your memory. To mark it.” Doug tears his gaze
from the horizon and looks at Randy searchingly, almost
beseeching him to understand. “This is one of the most
important moments of your life. Nothing will ever be the
same. We might get rich. We might get killed. We might just
have an adventure, or learn something. But we have been
changed.”
(“Cryptonomicon” by Neal Stephenson)
Informally, the episodic knowledge of a Xapagy agent is the totality
of the stories ever witnessed, read, heard, recalled or confabulated by
the agent. Technically, the episodic memory is a repository of all VIs
and instances which have been, at some time, part of the focus, and
is implemented as two weighted sets (of instances and VIs).
The episodic memory is neither addressable nor directly search-
able. The only way in which the content of the episodic memory
influences future behavior of the Xapagy agent is through the shadow
and headless shadow mechanisms.
We call the participation of the instances S(I, t) and VIs S(V, t)
in the episodic memory their salience (at time t). The salience is
maintained by two DAs:
(D+) Memorization - the salience of the instances and the VIs
increases while the instance or VI is in the focus
(D-) Forgetting - the salience of instances and VIs exponentially
decays in time.
A. Memorization
The memorization DA increases the memory salience of an in-
stance (or VI) during its stay in the focus. We will describe the
equations for the case of VIs, the case of the instances is similar. Let
us assume that the VI enters the focus at the creation time tc and
leaves it the demotion time td. In between these times, it’s salience
will be:
S(V, tx) =
∫ tx
tc
m(t)w(VSF , V )dt (11)
where m(t) is the marking rate of the focus at time t. While the
participation of the verb instance in the focus will gradually decrease,
its salience will increase throughout its stay in the focus reaching its
maximum salience at the moment when it is demoted to the memory:
Smax(V ) = S(V, td) =
∫ td
tc
m(t)w(VSF , V )dt (12)
What this formula tells us is that the memorization level is propor-
tional with the time spent in the focus. Action VI are memorized more
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than attribute assignment VIs8. Action verbs are memorized better
when they are not a part of a quick succession of events (when the
successors quickly push out the VIs from the focus). Summarization
VIs are remembered more strongly than individual events: the Xapagy
agent might remember the repeated hammering of a nail, but not the
individual act of hammering (see Subsection V-F).
In addition to this, the memorization also depends on the current
marking rate of the focus. The marking rate is a slowly changing
value, and is focus-wide. Verb instances inserted in the focus affect
the marking rate not only for themselves, but also for other verb
instances before and after them. This way, it is possible that a marking
action (such as the cigar smoking at the quote at the beginning of
this section) would affect the memorization of an unrelated story line,
which, however, share the focus with the marking action.
The current version of the Xapagy system uses a heuristic approach
for the setting of the marking rate, which, however, appears to be
successful in mimicking a wide range of behaviors. The formula
is based on an exponential smoothing of the contributions of each
inserted VI according to the formula:
m′(t) = λmm(t) + (1− λm)mc(V )
Currently, the smoothing factor λm is set to 0.8. The continuation
of the VI to the marking rate is dependent on the source of the VI.
To allow for an explicit setting of the marking rate, the CoreDKL
contains a special verb [marker] which allows us to artificially
increase the marking rate. The currently used values for the marking
rate contribution mc(V ) are summarized in the following table:
nature of V mc(V )
verb instances with the [marker] meta-verb 1.0
witnessed events 0.5
verbalized recall 0.3
non-verbalized recall 0.1
Future versions of the Xapagy system will extend on this memo-
rization model. Although it allows us to model explicit marker events,
it does not model other aspects of human memory formation (such as
the emotion caused by recalling certain experiences, which have not
been very memorable when originally witnessed). There is a lot of
existing work on human memory formation which can be modeled
here - from the impact of levels of neurotransmitters in memorization
(e.g. serotonin and dopamine levels), overall fatigue, as well as hard
to measure aspects such as “interest”.
B. Forgetting
After being demoted to the memory, the salience of a VI decreases
along an exponential decay curve:
S(V, tx) = λ
tx−tdSmax(V ) (13)
The salience of a VI will never increase after it leaves the focus.
The recall of the VI does not increase its salience: it only creates
a new, similar VI which might reinforce its recall (see Case 4 in
Section VIII-C).
For most situations, however, the main challenge of adequate
remembering is not the decreasing salience of the verb instances, but
the initialization of the recall, which needs to create an appropriate
focus and shadow.
8But the attribute itself is retained, because that one is dependent on the
instance, which might have spent a lot more time in the focus. Thus the
Xapagy agent might remember an attribute of the instance, but not when it
acquired it - mimicking the limitations of human source memory.
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Fig. 6. The two levels of indirection between Xapi text and instances, and
the four traversal steps.
VII. THE XAPI ABSTRACTION AND REFERENCE RESOLUTION
The main external means of communication between a Xapagy
agent and an external entity (let us say, a human person or another
Xapagy agent) is the Xapi pidgin language.
When we refer to an internal element of a Xapagy agent (let us
say, the instance of Hector) we need to pass through at least two
steps of indirection. If we say “the trojan warrior”, these words
are first mapped into COs by a dictionary, then then two COs are
merged together into a single reference CO describing the sentence
part. Second, the reference CO must be mapped to an internal
instance, through the reference resolution process9. When the agent
communicates with the outside world, the indirection levels must be
traversed in the opposite order, from instances, to concept overlays
and on to words10.
Figure 6 describes the four operations traversing the two indirection
levels.
Word interpretation is the process which, starting from a list of one
or more Xapi words forming a sentence part creates a reference CO
(or VO) corresponding to these words.
Reference resolution is the process of finding in the focus the
instance (or VI) to which the reference CO (or reference VO) refer
to.
Reference finding is the process of creating a reference CO for a
particular instance.
Concept verbalization is the process of finding one or more Xapi
words, which wen interpreted, will approximate a specific reference
CO.
The activities on the upward path (reference finding, and concept
verbalization) are always performed with the expectation that the
generated Xapi text will traverse a downward path in a target agent.
The target agent might be identical to the source agent, in case of
self-narration. But most typically it is a different agent.
This opens an apparently impossible challenge: the target agent
might have a different dictionary and different concepts. In the strong
philosophical sense there is the impossibility of perfect understanding
9It is quite possible that future developments in the Xapagy architecture,
such as the introduction of word polymorphism would increase the number
of indirection levels.
10Note that not every conceivable concept overlay can be expressed using
words, especially if the agent has a limited dictionary. We might be tempted
to declare this an example of lingustic relativity, in the interpretation of the
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and its modern revisions. But as here we are talking
about a pidgin language artificially designed to have a low representational
power, drawing any further conclusions would be circular reasoning.
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[16], but even in a purely technical reading there is a major challenge
that an agent can not generate an optimal output unless it knows the
dictionary and concepts of the target agents. Although we are not
oblivious to these theoretical and technical difficulties, in practice
we have adopted a solution which is not very different from what a
human might do: perform the upward path with the assumption that
he itself is the target, add a safety margin to the reference finding,
and, if necessary, restrict the vocabulary to match the vocabulary of
the target agent.
Throughout our discussion below, we will consider the target of the
reference to be an instance. Reference to VIs occurs comparatively
rarely (in adverbial sentences only) and it is largely analogous to the
instance case.
A. Word interpretation
Xapi sentence parts are composed of one or more words. These are
mapped into COs or VOs by the word interpretation process, some
of them being further processed as references to an instance.
For the generated COs and VOs we will use the name reference
CO/VO if it is used as a reference, template CO/VO if it is used
as a template to create a new instance or VI, and attribute CO/VO
if it is used to change the attributes of an instance or VI. The
word interpretation process, however, is identical for all these cases.
The following table shows the ways in which different sentence
components are interpreted and how there are going to be further
processed.
Sentence part Interpreted as Next step
Verb template VO VI creation
the SubI reference CO reference resolution
a/an SubI template CO instance creation
the ObjI reference CO reference resolution
a/an ObjI template CO instance creation
SubVI reference VO VI reference resolution
ObjCO attribute CO impact-add as attributes
ObjVO attribute VO impact-add as VI attributes
For example, in the sentence:
1 The tall red man / is-a / angry.
the subject part “the tall red man” is a SubI, so will be first mapped to
a reference CO of the specified attributes, then the reference resolved
to find an instance which matches those attributes. The ObjCO part
“angry” will be similarly mapped to an attribute CO, but it will not
be further resolved - this CO will be used to add to the subject
instance, as a side effect of the verb [is-a]. The word “is-a” will
be interpreted as a template VO and will be used to create the VI for
this sentence.
In the following, we will present a discussion of the challenges of
the word resolution, and the current set of compromises and solutions
adopted by the Xapagy system.
The current version of the Xapagy system performs word inter-
pretation by direct dictionary lookup followed by cross referenced
impacted addition. The dictionary lookup in the current version is
context independent11 - the same word will create the same CO
independently of which sentence part it occurs in or the current
content of the focus and shadows.
Let us explain the rationality behind the cross referenced impacted
addition method. Naturally, the simplest solution would be to simply
sum the COs mapped to the different words in the dictionary. The
11More exactly, the Xapagy system has in place the architecture to support
context dependency: however, in our current work, we did not found the need
or the representational advantages for it.
problem appears when these overlays have elements which have
negative impacts with each other.
Let us see an example. The word warrior, maps to a CO including
the concept [human], which in its turn, impacts [alive]. So if we
have a sentence such as:
1 A warrior / exists.
what the agent will model is a warrior who is alive. If we say
however:
1 The dead warrior / is-a / "Hector".
what we mean is a dead warrior. We do not want the impacts to
cancel each other out: the [alive] impact of the warrior word
needs to be eliminated before it even appears on the overlay.
B. Reference resolution
Reference resolution finds an instance in the focus which, in a way,
matches the reference CO. In Xapagy, the resolution process has two
steps:
• determine in which scene the reference resolution would take
place
• determine which instance in the specified scene is the target of
the reference
Scene resolution: the agent maintains a current scene which is set
explicitly by the [is-current-scene] and [is-only-scene] the
verbs. The current scene is used for the resolution of all primary
sentences.
For the quote component of the quotation sentences, the scene used
to resolve the references is the embedded sentence of the instance is
obtained from the ObjI part in the inquit, which first, in itself, needs
to be resolved within a virtual scene composed of the other scenes.
Instance resolution: in the Xapagy system is based on the elimina-
tion of the alternatives. The reference CO must be chosen in such
a way as to mismatch all the candidate instances which it does not
refer to. The reference will be resolved to the strongest instance in
the focus which it does not mismatch.
A reference CO CR is mismatched with an instance I if:
• it has a highly specific concept not present in the attributes of I
• it has concepts which have a negative impact on the attributes
of I
The mismatch between CR and the attributes C of instance I can
be calculated with the following formula:
mismatch(CR, C) =
max
c∈CR
(
en(c, CR)− w · en(c, C)
area(c)
)
−
∑
c∈CR
min
(
impact(c, C), 0
)
(14)
The instances which have a mismatch higher than a predefined
threshold will be eliminated from the reference competition. It is not
necessary to reduce the field of candidates to zero: if the field still
has several candidates, the one with the highest current participation
in the focus will be chosen as the referred instance. This technique
allows for recentness based reference resolution:
1 "Achilles" / is-a / warrior.
2 He / is-a / trojan.
where the word “he” is dictionary mapped to [human male].
[human male] will not mismatch with neither Achilles, nor Hector
or Ulysses. In the current context however, the newly referred instance
Achilles will be the strongest instance in the focus, thus the reference
will be resolved to him.
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Such a reference becomes more and more ambiguous as the
distance between the last reference to Achilles and the use of the word
“he” is increasing. When we use the referrence “Achilles”, however,
we use the highly specific concept [‘‘Achilles’’] which is only
contained by the instance Achilles. This reference is unambiguous,
because it will leave only one candidate (as long as there is only one
person named Achilles in the story - for Ajax however, we need to
use “great Ajax” and “lesser Ajax”).
An interesting side-effect of the mismatch function allows refer-
ence through negation:
1 The not-trojan warrior / hits / "Hector".
1) Special resolution rules for quotations: As we have seen, the
quote statements trigger special resolution rules. The elements of the
inquit statement are resolved in the current scene, while the parts of
the quote are resolved in the scene specified in the inquit.
In quoted statements there are some special resolution rules cor-
responding to pronouns. These are special words, which, despite the
fact that they are in the quote, they resolve in the scene of the inquit:
- [I] or [me] in the quote resolves back to the inquit subject.
- [Thou] in the quote resolves to the strongest instance in the
scene which is not group nor the inquit subject.
- [You] in the quote resolves to the strongest instance in the scene
which is not the inquit subject (it can be a group).
- [We] in the quote resolves to the strongest group in the scene
which includes the inquit subject.
C. Reference finding
Reference finding is the process of finding a reference CO CR for a
specific instance I. As we discussed in the introduction of this section,
the Xapagy system assumes that the target agent to be the same as
the source agent. However, additional criteria apply to the choice of
the reference, and this criteria normally includes a preference against
ambiguity in reference12. One way to trivially achieve a reference is
to refer to instances with their complete set of attributes:
1 The greek warrior man "Achilles" / hits /
2 the trojan warrior man "Hector".
A better choice is to find a minimal reference CO, that is, an
overlay which has the smallest energy but which eliminates all the
other alternatives. As the proper names have the smallest area, this
almost always means referring by proper name:
1 "Achilles" / hits / "Hector".
This reference mode, repeated over the complete course of the
story appears boring to a human reader. The current implementation
allows us to install a preference model for the chosen references.
This can be used to implement:
• prefer the use of pronouns (he, she, it) whenever they resolve
correctly
• avoid to refer with anything other than the pronoun I, you and
thou in all occasions where these can be applied (i.e. the agent
should not talk about itself in third person).
• the Homeric approach of using of a proper name with a returning
epithet: swift-footed Achilles, man-killing Hector.
• preference for a certain type of attributes (e.g. nationality, age
and so on).
However, the current version of Xapagy does not contain support
for automatic setting or adjustment of these values.
12We choose either references which mismatch against all the instances in
the scene except the referred item, or find a large gap between the relative
focus participation of the referred instance and other candidates.
D. Verbalization
The last step of our process involves the problem of selecting a
collection of words from the dictionary such that they express the
reference CO. Not all the possible COs can be expressed with words.
If the CO we try to express is referring to an instance whose attributes
have been acquired from Xapi, then, necessarily, the complete set
of attributes can be expressed with words in the dictionary. But
even than, the concepts chosen in the reference CO might not be
expressible with words. Let us consider an agent which does not have
a word for “male”, and let us assume that the reference finding would
choose [male trojan] as a way to refer to Hector. The agent might
try to approximate this with “trojan man”, but that is overreaching,
as it will be interpreted as [male human trojan]13.
The current approach is to generate a series of candidate word
combinations (limited to a maximum of two words) and then calculate
the distance between the CO generated by these through word
interpretation and the original CO we want to express. The distance
calculation is based on two penalty values:
• the penalty for the unexpressed content (the part of the overlay
which is not conveyed by words) PUC = f(Cintended−Cwords)
• the penalty for the additional content (the additional concept
conveyed by the words but not part of the recalled overlay)
PAC = f(Cwords − Cintended)
The set of words to be chosen are such that they minimize PUC+
αPAC where α is the unintended meaning amplification ratio (which
can be chosen freely but in our experiments we set it to 10.0).
VIII. NARRATIVE REASONING IN XAPAGY
It is finally time to integrate the components discussed throughout
this paper and describe how the architecture of the Xapagy system
enables narrative reasoning. We start by describing the common
framework of all narrative reasoning techniques, the headless shad-
ows (Subsection VIII-A).
Then, we dedicate a subsection each to the following aspects of
narrative reasoning techniques:
- Story following (Subsection VIII-B): predicting ongoing events,
expressing surprise about events and filling in missing events.
- Story creation (Subsection VIII-C): creating new stories
through recall or confabulation (or various shades in between).
- Divagations (Subsection VIII-D): creating VIs which do not
advance the story line but can be necessary (such as the
introduction of instances) or helpful (such as elaborating on
instances or justifying VIs).
- Story steering (Subsection VIII-E) the means through which
the story creation process can be guided either by the agent
itself or external agents. This includes the recall or confabulation
initiation process, the use of questions, as well as, in the extreme
case, of collaborative story telling.
A. Headless shadows
All the narrative reasoning techniques rely on the mechanism
of headless shadows (HLS), collections of related and aligned in-
memory VIs which are not paired with any current in-focus VI.
Like shadows, HLS-s are maintained on an ongoing basis through
a collection of SAs and DAs. All the narrative reasoning models can
be understood in terms of a single procedural pattern:
• maintain a collection of HLSs reflecting the current state of the
narration
13It is obvious that the reference finding and concept verbalization compo-
nents will need to communicate in some way. This communication does not
exist in the current version of Xapagy.
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Fig. 7. A simplified representation of the continuation HLS formation.
• choose an HLS for instantiation based on a specific criteria
• instantiate the HLS by creating a new VI
• insert the new VI to the focus and transform the HLS into its
regular shadow
• verbalize the VI
The difference between the narrative reasoning methods stems from
whether they skip one or more steps of the procedure, as well as the
different criteria they might use to choose the HLS for instantiation.
HLSs can be created in several ways. The most direct model is
the continuation HLS, which are created by the clustering of the
successors of verb instances in regular shadows.
For illustrative purposes we will describe the HLS formation as
a step-by-step process involving discrete steps. In practice, this is a
continuous, ongoing activity performed by DAs.
Let us consider the example described in Figure 7. In the first
step, the agent maintains three VIs in the focus, with their respective
shadows (the rightmost VI is the most recent one). The size of the
disk denotes the participation of a given verb instance in the focus
or shadow, respectively. The focus is shadowed by VIs from three
different stories. The VIs linked by successor relationships from the
shadows create a continuation pool.
In the second step, the elements of the continuation pool are
clustered in continuation HLSs. The HLS contains a template of the
possible verb instance it can instantiate. VIs from the continuation
pool lend support to certain HLSs based on their match with the
template.
Many of the DA’s for the maintenance of shadows also operate for
HLSs (for instance, story consistency). However, the low level details
of the SAs and DAs performing the HLS maintenance, as well as the
discussion of boundary cases such as what happens if the shadow
predicts the apparition of a new instance, is beyond the scope of this
paper.
B. Story following: Predicting ongoing events, expectation fulfillment
and surprise
In this simplest narrative reasoning method the agent is a passive
observer of the ongoing flow of events.
When a new VI is added to the focus from external sources
(witnessing, reading, conversation), it will be matched against the
continuation HLSs. If there is a match, the HLS will become the
shadow of the new VI.
This activity is an SA, and in its turn will trigger changes both in
the other shadows and the continuation HLSs. The story consistency
DA, for instance, will ensure that the shadow components which
predicted the right continuation will be reinforced and HLSs which
are compatible with the new HLS will be reinforced. New HLSs are
calculated starting from the current focus and shadow, while those
which became incompatible with the current status will be lowered
in support or even discarded.
We introduce two metrics with regards to the agent’s perception
of the incoming event: expectation fulfillment and surprise.
- The expectation fulfillment is the support of the HLS matched
to the incoming VI (or zero is no such HLS has been found). If
there is no match, this value is zero. We say that an event was
expected if there was a HLS with a strong support matching it,
and unexpected otherwise.
- The surprise is defined as the magnitude of change in the
continuation pool, triggered by the event (according to an
appropriate distance metric defined in the continuation pool).
With this definition, even the least surprising event will have a
non-zero value, as the continuation HLSs will adjust, extending
themselves into the future. For purposes of analysis, we can
define the normalized surprise, which is the surprise of the
actually happened event minus the minimum possible surprise.
Expectation fulfillment and surprise are related metrics, but they
can not be trivially transformed into each other. For many situations,
the most expected event will generate the least surprise. However, we
can have highly unexpected events, which do not create a surprise. Let
us consider a scenario in which Hector, in the heat of the battle, stops
to wipe his brow. This is unexpected: none of the HLSs could have
predicted this. However, it has little impact on the predictions, so it is
not surprising. Surprising events trigger a change in the continuations,
as they determine the future flow of the story. The death of the Hector
is not unexpected in the context of a duel. It has however a large
surprise value, as it causes the Xapagy agent to completely change
the continuation pool, as the continuations involving further actions
by Hector will be removed.
C. Story creation: recalling and confabulating
Recalling a story in Xapagy implies maintaining the HLSs, select-
ing an appropriate continuation HLS, instantiating it and inserting
17
it into the focus. We call this operation a recall if the sequence of
instantiated VIs closely resemble a previously experienced story. We
call it confabulation if the new story does not resemble any previously
declared story. Perfect recall can be achieved in the Xapagy system
only under very strict, not naturally occurring conditions. On the
other hand, there are many fine gradations between perfect recall
and freely associative confabulations, most of these mimicking, in a
recognizable way, human behaviors.
We will illustrate the range of possible recall / confabulation
behaviors through a series of cases. These cases assume that the agent
is already in recall mode, and the appropriate initalizations have been
performed.
Due to space limitations, we need to describe each of these cases
in a cursory manner. Their presentation, however, is necessary to
understand the range of functionality which can be achieved through
the recall mechanism of the Xapagy system.
To illustrate these cases, we will rely on a series of graphs. These
graphs are simplifications, they are not outputs of actual runs. For the
reader to get a good feel of what is presented and what is suppressed
in these graphs, we need some introductory definitions.
We call a story line a collection of VIs which have been directly
connected through succession links. One can, of course, envision
the lifespan of the Xapagy agent as a whole continuous story line.
In practice, however, long temporal spans, the replacement of the
instances and scenes segments the agent’s episodic memory into
distincts episodes. Note, however, that the story lines are just an
ascriptive definition of certain subsets of the episodic memory, which
we make for easier readability (in this case, with graphs). The VIs
are not labeled with story line identifiers.
To define a recall scenario, we assume that a desire to reproduce
a specific story line from the past, which we will call the dominant
story line. Other story lines which enter into consideration during
the recall are called foreign story lines. As we move from simple
recall towards confabulation, the difference between the dominant
and foreign story lines becomes increasingly blurred.
Let us now define the format of the figuress we shall use. The
figures describe the continuation HLSs, with their instantiation tem-
plate (as a circle drawn with dotted line). The size of the instantiation
template circle illustrates the total support of the HLS. The HLSs
are represented by dark gray rectangles. Inside the rectangles, we
have disks representing support from VIs in the episodic memory:
the size of the disks illustrates the strength of the support. Some in-
memory VIs can support more than one HLS; we only show them in
the HLS which they support the most strongly. Support VIs coming
from different story lines will be colored or marked differently. VIs
marked with solid colors have been created from external sources
(reading, witnessing, conversation), those marked with a symbol (⊕
or ⊗) from internal sources (recall or confabulation). The dominant
story line will be denoted with white disks. We show the succession
links between the support VIs with arrows. In practice, a VI can have
several succession links, we only show the strongest one.
Some figures will also contain the VIs in the focus, with their
shadows. We do not represent instances in the focus and nor their
shadows.
Figure 8 illustrates all these drawing conventions.
1) Case 1: Pure recall of a witnessed story: Pure recall is the
accurate reproduction of the events in a story line, un-contaminated
by the influence of other story lines in the episodic memory. This can
happen if each HLS is supported by a single VI, from the dominant
story line (we call this the purity condition).
For a practical agent, the purity condition is difficult to achieve.
The “matching the head” and “matching the body” DAs will bring
in shadows from any previous VI with a similar VO. The more
experience an agent has in the specific domain, the more likely
is that its shadows during recall will contain elements outside the
dominant line. These shadow elements will send their successors into
the continuation pool, and some of them will support some of the
HLSs.
The purity condition can be maintained if either:
• the agent is completely clueless in the domain (it has no previous
experience with any of the the concepts appearing in the recalled
story line)14.
• the story is so surprising that none of the other remembered
stories can support the recall
Figure 9 shows the pure recall scenario. The HLSs, which are
selected and instantiated from left-to-right, exactly mirror the VIs in
the original story line. The purity condition is satisfied as each HLS
is only supported by a VI from the recalled story line.
We emphasize that the purity condition applies only to the HLSs.
The shadows and even the continuation pool can have some elements
outside the dominant story line, as long as they do not reach the
threshold to enter the HLSs.
2) Case 2: Competitive recall: As we have seen, the purity
condition can be satisfied only under very restrictive conditions. In
addition to the dominant story line a number of foreign story lines
will (a) provide support to the HLSs generated by the dominant story
line and/or (b) create foreign HLS-s, which are not supported by the
dominant story line.
We say that the dominant story line competes for the recall with
the other story lines. The dominant story wins the competition if
the resulting recall is identical to the one from a pure recall. The
dominant story looses to the other stories every time the recall is
distorted from the pure recall. For Case 2 we assume that these losses
are localized: the recalled story will still largely follow the dominant
story line.
The dominant story can loose out to the foreign story lines in the
following ways:
HLS distortion: happens if an HLS, created by the dominant story
line is supported by one or more foreign VIs.
Let us assume that the agent tries to recall Homer’s Iliad, where
Hector was killed with a spear to his throat. But the agent has also
seen the Hollywood movie Troy where Hector is killed with a sword
to the chest. These two events are close enough to support the same
HLS, but the different supports are not identical and the recalled verb
instance might be different from the one in the dominant story (the
Iliad in this case).
Skipping story elements: Let us assume that the dominant story line
had generated four HLSs, which in a pure recall would be recalled
in the order A → B → C → D (see Figure 10). However, B and D
are strongly supported by a foreign story line, while C is not. Under
these conditions, it is possible that the recall process would skik the
poorly supported C, making the recall A → B → D.
14We must mention here that in the current version of the Xapagy agent
it is possible to have conceptual knowledge without associated episodic
knowledge. It is possible, for instance, for an agent to have a model for the
verb “kill” without having witnessed, heard, or read about any story involving
killing.
An of course, in philosophy, psychology and linguistics the existence of
concepts predating experience is about the largest cans of worms which one
can open.
It is not our intention to make a statement with this. In the current version
of the Xapagy system this state of affairs is simply an artifact of the fact that
we do not yet have in place a mechanism for concept learning.
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Focus
Shadows Headless shadows
In-focus verb instances Instantiation templates of the HLS-s (size show total 
support)
Supporting in-memory 
verb instances of the 
dominant story line
Size of the disk shows the 
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foreign story line of 
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Fig. 8. Illustrating the conventions of the representations for the cases on the recall / confabulation axis.
Fig. 9. Case 1: Pure recall of a witnessed story. The purity condition is satisfied: all the support of the HLSs comes exclusively from the dominant story
line. The shadows, however, can contain components from the foreign story lines.
A B C D
Fig. 10. Case 2: Competitive recall. The competing story line triggers the
skipping of the story element C from the dominant story line.
Inserting foreign story elements: similarly to the previous case, the
recall inserts a story element not present in the dominant story line,
but strongly supported by one or more foreign story lines.
3) Case 3: Recalling frequent events: This case considers the
challenge to recall one specific dominant story line from a collection
of near identical story lines, such are recalling what one had for
breakfast on a certain day. The psychology literature on autobio-
graphical memory frequently calls this type of memories repisodes.
The phenomena has been identified and well documented since the
1980s [8] and still under active research [4]. This is a well known
challenge for the human memory, as the similarity between the events
makes it more difficult to recall one particular event in an individual
way.
Let us assume that the agent experienced a number of “break-
fast” stories, involving either “bread-eggs-coffee” or “bread-sausage-
coffee” type of breakfasts. Naturally, these story lines do not float in
the empty space: they are embedded in the particular story line of
the given day which includes what happened before, during and after
the breakfast in the specific day.
The support structure of the HLSs this case is shown in Figure 11.
HLSs for each typical breakfast action will be created. Each will be
supported by large number of VIs, due to the large number of near-
identical foreign story lines. There will be little difference between
their relative strengths and each of the supports will be small (due
to the negative feedback mechanism in the match the shadow head
DA). Thus, we have a variation on the competitive recall, with many
weak, evenly matched competitors.
Accurate recall under these conditions can only be achieved if
(a) there were some differentiating factors for the specific episode
and (b) these differentiating factors can be recreated during recall.
The flip side of this, however, is that truly repetitive activities, with
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Fig. 11. Case 3: Recalling frequent events. Black: bread / sausage / coffee,
White: break / eggs / coffee.
A B C D
Fig. 12. Case 4: Self shadowing and drifting. The frequent ommission of
the VI C from the retelling (for instance by constraints) drifts the story line,
such that the retelling will proceed on the story line A→ B→ D even when
no constraints are present.
no distinguishing factors, can not be accurately recalled for specific
cases. If an agent had alternatively eaten sausage and eggs, with no
other distinguishing factors in the story of the morning, it will not
be able to recall what it did exactly in a specific day.
4) Case 4: Self shadowing recall. Drift: In the previous case,
we considered the case where the agent had witnessed many highly
similar stories. This case deals with a variant of this case, where the
agent had witnessed a story only once (and the story can be highly
specific), but recalled it many times.
The Xapagy system differentiates between direct experience,
hearsay and recall through the circumstances of an event (the scene,
predecessors, successor, whether it is the quote part of a quotation
statement). We can, for instance recall seeing a movie where Homer
is narrating the Iliad. The story of the Iliad will be encoded through
a two level quoting. Nevertheless, even in this case, the narrated Iliad
forms a valid story, with the succession links chaining through the
elements of the Iliad’s story line (with separate links chaining through
Homer’s narration, and our watching actions, respectively).
These narrations are clearly separated: it is not the case that the
Xapagy system cannot recall the source of the information provided
that it is correctly initialized to recall the watching scene15.
Despite the ability to explicitly recall the source of a specific story,
the foreign story lines brought in by the DAs maintaining shadows
and the HLSs will contain all types of verb instances both externally
and internally generated, directly witnessed, read or heard. This is
a necessary and useful part of the system - for example, allows a
15Although an accurate recall for the whole chain might be difficult to
achieve, as the watching the television activity most definitely fall under the
category of “repisodes”, creating the situation in Case 3.
Xapagy agent to make correct predictions when witnessing real world
situations about which previously it had only “book knowledge”.
The phenomena of self-shadowing and story drift is an inevitable
consequence of this otherwise useful functionality.
Figure 12 illustrates the situation. The agent tries to recall the
dominant story, which, we assume, was directly witnessed. The
previous recalls are marked with ⊕ and ⊗ symbols. As these recalls
are necessarily very close to the original story, they will inevitably
support the specific HLSs. We call this phenomena self-shadowing.
This can have both positive and negative consequences. On the
positive side, accurate recalls reinforce the HLSs of the dominant
story, and make it less likely that foreign stories can compete with
the recall. This is especially important if the agent recalls events for
which the salience had naturally decayed.
With this mechanism, the Xapagy system automatically exhibits
learning through repetition (it is a future task to investigate whether
such observations about human learning such as the Eberhardt
learning curve or Paul Pimsleur’s spaced repetition technique can
be automatically mimicked by the Xapagy agent).
Let us now consider, however, the case when the recalls have not
been fully accurate. If the recalls differ from the dominant story
line in a consistent way (for instance, by regularly skipping some
events, the situation in Figure 12) there will be a strong likelihood
that a specific recall will follow not the original story line but the
“usual way of recalling it”. This phenomena, which we will call story
drift, mimics suppressed memories and self-deception in humans.
A closely related situation is when the shadowing stories are not
coming from internal recalls, but from external retelling of the same
story in modified form. This might mimic human behavior where,
for instance, excessive external praise might modify the person’s own
recollection of certain stories in the past.
One would hope, for instance that humans can simply filter out
internally generated stories to affect the recall - but apparently
humans do not have a build in filter for this purpose.
A very famous example of self shadowing is the case of Nixon’s
counsel John Dean analyzed by Neisser [18]. In several cases where
Dean had recalled with high confidence details of meetings with
Nixon, it turns out that what he had recalled was heavily modified
by his fantasies and modified recalls of the event (both omission of
events and insertion of events have been noted). It was also found
that at its testimony, the main source of rememberence is not the
original events but the statement about it he have a couple of days
before.
5) Case 5: Constrained recall: The cases up to this point made the
assumption that the goal is the accurate recall of the dominant story
line. Case 5 deals with the case when the objective is to recall the
dominant story line subject to a number of constraints. One possible
reason to do this is to adapt the story to the preferences of the
audience. We can use constraints to produce a bowdlerized version
of a story, such as a children’s version of the Iliad would not have
Achilles kill Hector, only “defeat” him.
The current version of the Xapagy system implements constraints
by adding an additional filtering layer, which changes the overall
support of the HLSs16.
If we are in a situation of pure recall, the only possible impact
of the constraints is to remove certain events from the story line. In
the case of competitive recall, however, the introduction of constraints
can lead to the replacement or even insertion of new VIs in the recall
as it locally changes the balance of power between the dominant and
the competing foreign story lines.
16Future versions might operate at the level of individual supports inside
the HLSs
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Constraint filter
A B C D
Fig. 13. Case 5: Constrained recall. An example of a constrained recall
inserting a foreign component in the dominant story line. The constrained
recall will be A → C → D instead of A → B → D.
Figure 13 shows such an example. At the moment represented
in the figure, 4 continuation HLSs are maintained. The chain of a
future recall will be A → B → D, correctly following the dominant
story line. However, the application of the constraint filter removes
A from consideration, which brings into the recall HLS B, supported
only by the foreign story line, which would not have been considered
otherwise. After this divergence, however, the recalled story returns
to the dominant story line, so the recall will be A → C → D.
6) Case 6: Leading questions: Case 6 deals with the situation
where the recall deviates from the dominant story line in response
to specific statements coming from an external agent. We call
this case “leading questions” due to the obvious similarity to the
influencing the recall through leading questions as it might happen
in a courtroom. However, the external text does not necessarily have
to be a question.
For an external statement to affect the recall, it is necessary for the
VIs of the recall and the VIs obtained from the conversation partners
to share the same scene. Although the design of the Xapagy system
in this respect is in flux, we assume that such a model would indeed
be the default. The implication is that the agent would maintain only
one instance of Hector and Achilles, involving both the VIs from its
own recall and the VIs received from the conversation17.
Figure 14 shows an example of how a leading statement can affect
the recall. In the right side of the figure, we see the focus, with the
VIs in white being previously recalled, while the VI in black being
inserted externally, through a conversation. All the VIs will create
support for various HLSs. An inserted statement does not necessarily
change the flow of the recall: it might, for instance, support the same
dominant story line, or the inserted HLS might support an HLS
which has very low total support which will never be chosen for
instantiation.
However, an external statement can change the flow of the recall
if it supports an HLS which is already in close competition for the
continuation, i.e. it is supported by other story lines in the agent’s
episodic memory. Thus, a successful leading statement (or question)
17The Xapagy architecture also allows a scenario in which the agent
maintains two different instances in two different scenes. We can also envision
linking these two instances with a special identity (conversational identity).
This is consistent with the practice of the rest of the Xapagy system where we
are using similar identity relations to maintain, for instance, somatic identity
between instances undergoing change.
Fig. 15. Story line jumping. The VIs marked with black gradually increase
in support and become the dominant story line.
is one which is based on existing tendencies of the agent (e.g.
stereotypical continuations of certain stories).
In the figure, the inserted statement will increase the support of
HLS B (which is also supported, albeit weakly, by the dominant
story line). This additional support changes the flow of the recall
from A → C → D to B → C → D.
7) Case 7: Story line jumping: Up to this point we assumed that
the recall follows a single dominant story line, with potentially minor
disturbances or deviations. Case 7 considers the situation where the
agent switches the dominant story line, and starts to follow a new
story line. For instance, an agent might follow the Iliad up to the
point where Achilles kills Hector, then switch to the story of King
Arthur and follow a story line where Achilles has a illicit love affair
with the wife of Menelaus (that is, with Helen).
The switching of the story line maintains the scenes and instances.
However, the shadows will be gradually taken over by the instances
from the newly followed story line. The recall will still be about a
warrior called Achilles - however, the shadow of the instance Achilles
will be dominated by the in-memory instance of Lancelot.
Story line jumping is a natural extension of competitive recall.
In Case 2 we considered situations where only a small number of
additional HLSs have been received from the foreign story line before
returning to the dominant story line.
In the current version of Xapagy, if the recall follows at least two-
three HLSs from the foreign story line, the dominance will inevitably
jump to the foreign story line, as the story consistency DA will
reinforce the new story line. In our example, it is enough for the
story line to shift from the Iliad to the Knights of the Round Table
for several VIs to establish the Arthurian epic as the new dominant
story line. This does not satisfactorily mimic the human story telling,
which allows for much longer detours before returning to a main story
line. In functionality which is currently under implementation, the
summarization VIs would provide a greater stability of the story line
over longer stretches of time. This would allow the recall to include
relatively long elements of the foreign story, without abandoning the
current story line. For example, with this functionality we would be
able to insert a love affair between Achilles and Helen while still
remaining in the general outlines of the Iliad.
8) Case 8: Random wandering: In our last considered case, the
recall performs frequent story line jumps. In the extreme version of
this case, the dominant story line can be different for every recalled VI
(a situation illustrated in Figure 16). The recalled story will resemble
no witnessed, heard or read story, although the individual VIs will
still be instantiated based on an HLSs supported by VIs from the
episodic memory. The agent can not recall a VI of “kissing”, if it
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Fig. 14. Case 6: Leading questions. Without the leading question, the recall will be A → C → D. The leading question however, brings into the shadow
a foreign story line, which creates a different interpretation of HLS A, in HLS B (an interpretation which is still supported, albeit weakly, by the dominant
story line). The recall will, thus, proceed along the lines of B → C → D.
Fig. 16. Random wandering
had not witnessed, heard or read about this action. However, HLS
might have support coming from multiple story lines, with the various
verbs averaging out in the instantiation template. Thus the recalled
VI might not be an exact match of any previously encountered VI.
Case 8 can be used to mimic daydreaming and the creative process
of original story writing. On the pathological side, it can mimic
fantasy prone personality (FPP), Ganser’s syndrome and other related
disorders.
The Xapagy agent, in its default settings, will not perform such a
random walk. However, its parameters can be tuned to random walk
by:
• An inconsistent, possibly time-variable constraint filter.
• Lowering of the strength of the story consistency DA in the
shadows.
• Introducing a counter-consistency DA, operating on the shadows
and HLSs which reduce the support from story lines which have
been recently followed.
D. Divagations
Hence the risk of what I would call Salgarism. When
characters in Emilio Salgari’s adventures escape through
the forest, pursued by enemies, and stumble over a baobab
root, the narrator suspends the action in order to give us a
botany lesson on the baobab. Now this has become topos,
charming, like the defects of those we have loved; but it
should not be done.
(“The title and the meaning [of the Name of the Rose]”
by Umberto Eco)
We will group under the term divagations all the recalled VIs which
do not directly advance the story. The agent performs a divagation
during recall if it does not instantiate a continuation HLS, instead
it creates a VI through different means. The term divagation is
not used in a pejorative sense: many divagations are necessary to
maintain the flow of the recalled story, many of them are important
in communication to allow the communication partner to create an
accurate match of the recalled story18. We will consider three types
of divagations:
• instance creation and initial characterization
• elaborating on instances
• justifying actions
In the following we shall describe these divagations in more detail.
1) Instance creation and initial characterization: A recalled story
involves not only actions but also active and passive participants (war-
riors, swords, shields). We need to create instances in the current story
for each of them, and for this we need explicit, [create-instance]
type VIs.
The creation of the instances is mandatory: before the recalled
story can first instantiate a VI using that instance, the instance must
exist in the focus, and it needs to have a shadow which connects
to the right HLS. Even if we recall the dominant story exactly,
the instance creation still must be handled separately, because the
[create-instance] VIs are not action VIs, they will not be
instantiated through continuation HLSs19.
The agent has considerable freedom with respect to when to create
the instances, and what attributes will the instance initially receive.
The agent can follow several strategies. The current implementation
of the Xapagy system uses a just-in-time strategy: the continuation
HLS is chosen and if one of the parts of its template maps to
a non-existent instance, the instance is created before the HLS is
instantiated.
An alternative approach (not currently implemented in the Xapagy
system) would parse the current continuation chain, collect all the
necessary instances, and instantiate them in a single burst of instanti-
ation. As it happens, Homer uses an extreme variant of this approach:
in the “catalogue of the ships” in the second book of the Iliad he lists
18This applies both to real time, interactive communication, as well as
creating stories for later reading.
19Except in cases where the instance has been created through an action:
i.e. it was made, born, appeared or it was created as a result of a change
operation
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all the 29 contingents of the Greeks led by 46 captains, introducing
all the Greek characters of the epic at its very beginning.
A newly introduced instance must be immediately characterized
with some attributes in order to be able to play its role in the recalled
story. The memory instances shadowing the newly created instance
have all the attributes they acquired up to the moment when they
left the focus. It is as if the agent would know, at the first word of
the retelling of the Iliad, all the attributes of, say, Ulysses (which, in
fact, the human narrator does know). Only a subset of these attributes
need to be assigned to the newly created instance immediately after
creation. The Xapagy agent considers three criteria in the assignment
of the initial attributes: (a) referential uniqueness, (b) conveying the
“essence” and (c) shadow uniqueness.
(a) The referential uniqueness criteria requires that the newly
introduced instance should have enough attributes to be uniquely
referrable in the focus. The proper noun (if there is one) is a
particularly good choice:
1 Scene / create-instance / "Ulysses".
but other choices are also good as long as they make the reference
unique:
1 A crafty warrior / exists.
2 An ithacan warrior / exists.
The Xapagy agent must satisfy the referential uniqueness criteria
if the story is verbalized, because in the Xapi form of the story,
an instance without referential uniqueness can not be referred again.
However, if the agent recalls a story internally, without verbalizing
it, it is sufficient that the shadow of the instance to be sufficiently
distinct, as that is the way in which the HLSs refer back to instances.
(b) Conveying the “essence”. When introducing a new entity in
natural language, we usually expect the narrator to make a charac-
terization which, in some sense, conveys the “essence” of the entity.
We can find examples of literary works, where this essence is not
conveyed directly. Thomas Carlyle noted that his wife has read the
poem Sordello by Robert Browning and had not been able to tell
whether Sordello was a man, a city or a book. Nevertheless, most
stories explicitly convey this meaning.
The current version of Xapagy can convey the “essence” by
requiring that an instance is characterized by at least one concept
near the “basic” level of the concept hierarchy (in the sense described
in Rosch et. al. [23]). In Xapagy, these are the concepts with an area
close to 1.0.
For instance, saying that Ulysses is a man (area = 1.0) or that he
is a warrior (area = 0.8) will satisfy the criteria. However, saying
that he is alive (area = 5.0) is too wide, while simply assigning a
narrow concept such as a proper name will also not be sufficient
(e.g. [‘‘Ulysses’’] has an area 0.05).
It is interesting to observe that the referential uniqueness criteria
favors concepts with a small area, while the essence criteria favors
concepts of a specific area (around 1.0).
(c) Shadow uniqueness criteria.
For a story recall in progress, the shadow of the instances provide
the link between the entities of the recalled story and the story lines
which generated it. In principle, we would desire a unique mapping:
a recalled instance must have shadows which contain exactly one
instance for each of the competing story lines. This means, as well,
that the shadow must be unique: it must be different from all the
other current shadows.
From the point of view of characterization, the shadow unique-
ness criteria becomes an issue because there is an interrelationship
between the attributes of the instance and the shadow: adding an
attribute to the instance will implicitly change the shadow as well
(even if the attribute came from the shadow (for instance, through
the matching the head DA).
2) Elaborating on instances: Elaborating on instances is the
divagation through which an agent, instead of recalling action verbs
which further the story, recalls is-a type VIs which add attributes
to various instances in the focus.
As we have seen, a certain number of attributes must be assigned
to the instance at its creation. Further attributes can be brought in
later.
The current implementation works as follows. The system creates
a number of elaboration HLSs, each containing an instance and an
attribute, chosen from those attributes of the shadow components
which do not already exist in the instance. The instantiation of such
an HLS will generate a VI of type I / is-a / C.
The elaboration HLSs compete with the continuation HLSs and the
other HLS types for the right to provide the next VI. The weight of
the elaboration HLSs in this competition is affected the the following
factors:
• Elaboration preference: a continuous, slowly changing weight-
ing factor which scales the weight of each elaboration HLS.
• Gradient: describes the difference between the attributes of
the shadow and the instance. Each instantiated elaboration
brings into the instance attributes present in the shadow, thus
diminishing the gradient.
• Saturation: the weight of further elaborations is reduced as the
number of attributes grow.
• Momentum: it is desirable to cluster elaborations in short bursts
of elaborations for a unique instance. If a certain elaboration
HLS had been chosen for instantiation, it creates a short term
increase in the preference for elaboration HLSs for the same
instance.
• External attribute preferences: an externally configured con-
cept overlay provides a weighting factor of which concepts are
preferred to be elaborated upon. This can not bring in atributes
which do not exist in the shadow, but can suppress those which
are preferred to be brought into the attributes of the current
instance.
3) Justifying actions: Over time, the existence of verb instances
in the memory of the agent generate cloud relationships among the
concepts and the verbs. A cloud, for instance, describes the likely set
of attributes of an instance which is the subject of a particular verb.
For instance, warriors are expected to strike their opponents, while
we would not expect a basket to do the same.
Justification is not mandatory. There is nothing to prevent an agent
from instantiating a verb instance whose parts are not justified.
In some cases no justification is possible. An example is the wolf
in the Little Red Riding Hood story: none of the known attributes of
the wolf are compatible with talking - yet this does not prevent the
narrative reasoning over the story.
E. Story steering
1) Initialization of the recall: In the Xapagy system there are no
specific markers of the beginning or the end of a story, nor a “name”
of a story which allows it to separate from the remainder of the
memory. If we want to trigger the recall of a specific story, we need
to externally create an environment in which the recall can be started.
The current version of the Xapagy system uses triggering by initial
condition - it requires the establishment of the initial condition of the
story in order to start the recall.
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1 Troy / is-only-scene.
2 A "Hector" / is-a / trojan warrior.
3 An "Achilles" / is-a / greek warrior.
4 "Hector" / hits / "Achilles".
5 Scene / recall narrate.
The first three lines establish a focus which contains Troy as
the scene and establishes the presence of Hector and Achilles in
the scene. The fourth line adds an action verb which will have
continuations20
In line 5, the [recall] verb switches the Xapagy agent into
recall mode. In this mode, the agent, instead of expecting VIs from
outside observations, it will generate them internally. The recall mode
terminates when the agent has decided that there is no sufficiently
supported HLS to instantiate next. Whether this can ever happen,
depends on the thresholds chosen and the parametrization of the HLS
creation. For some parameter combinations, the agent will jump from
one recalled story to another or to confabulate indefinitely.
The focus at the moment of starting the recall determines not
only the first recalled VI, but the subsequent shape of the recall as
well. If we want the agent to accurately recall a specific story, we
need to initialize the agent with the most specific components, and
parametrize the shadow maintenance processes to favor the strongest
component. Otherwise, the shadows will contain elements from other
stories, which then can shape the recalled narrative - or even cause
it to divert to a different story line altogether.
2) Story line sharpening: is a technique through which during a
competitive recall, we increase the lead of the dominant story line
in the shadows and the HLSs. Story line sharpening is especially
important when we need to choose between story lines whihc evolve
in parallel but diverge in the middle of the story.
Let us consider the example of Hector again. As we have shown,
we can consider:
• Hector the trojan warrior from the Iliad of Homer
• Hector the quantum recreation on the planet Mars from the novel
Ilium by Dan Simmons.
Which of these stories we are actually narrating? We can actually
narrate quite an extensive sequence of events without making a
choice. However, if at some moment we make a decision and choose
to elaborate on Hector with the statement:
1 "Hector" / is-a / quantum-recreation.
than this will affect the shadows: the interpretations based on Dan
Simmons’ novel will become stronger, and the future recalls will
become more likely to follow the novel’s story line (Hector forming
an alliance with Achilles against the gods).
Note that it is possible for an agent to recall an attribute from
another story line, yet it would not derail the story. For instance,
the talking wolf in the Little Red Riding Hood will be shadowed by
all the talking wolfs previously encountered, including the one from
the “Nu zaec, pogodi!” Russian cartoon, where the wolf is a heavy
smoker. It is possible to retell the story of Little Red Riding Hood
with a heavy smoker wolf without slipping away completely from
the story line. One reason for this is that in the cartoon, the wolf’s
nemesis is a bunny, which would not match well as a shadow for the
red hooded girl.
IX. RELATED WORK
The Xapagy system had been developed from scratch but not in
a void. In the following we shall compare and contrast it against
20The Xapagy system currently does not use the summary for recall
guidance, thus it can not automatically go to the beginning of a story. This is
an obvious and necessary future work.
a small collection of representative systems. Most of these systems
represent bodies of work which fit the Newell definition of cognitive
architecture [19] as integrative systems which try to provide a model
of a large subset of the human cognition even if they do not answer
to all the twelve requirements of a human cognitive architecture as
proposed in the “Newell test” (Anderson and Lebiere [3]). Some of
them have not been explicitly positioned as cognitive architectures.
We shall look both at differences and similarities in the approach.
The Xapagy system has taken a somewhat unusual approach to
issues such as instance and concept as well as in focusing on
episodic memory and shadowing as a single reasoning model. These
choices have their root in the application, computational efficiency
considerations - but also in the desire to try out roads less traveled.
Despite of this, we found unexpected similarities and convergencies
between Xapagy and approaches which have started out with radically
different assumptions.
Xapagy is a new system, developed over the last three years
and first described in this paper. When comparing it against other
architectures we will also focus not only on what we learned from
some of these systems but also what we might learn in the future.
The ACT-R cognitive architecture
ACT-R (Anderson and Lebiere [2], Anderson et al. [1]) is a
cognitive architecture developed based on the theoretical models
of John R. Anderson. It is the center of an active community of
researchers with many variants adapted to perform specific tasks.
Overall, the ACT-R community has been eager to integrate the system
with external models. Earlier extensions, such as the ACT-R/PM
(perceptual-motor) model have been integrated into the core of the
ACT-R system. A recent integration effort created the SAL hybrid
architecture through the integration of ACT-R and the Leabra neural
model (Jilk et al. [9]).
The central idea of the ACT-R system is the use of the production
as the model of the functioning of the human brain. A production
requires some preconditions to be satisfied, and then it can “fire”,
performing a certain action. Unlike other models such as EPIC, ACT-
R is based on a serial-bottleneck theory of cognition, where only one
production can fire at a time. This is similar to the Xapagy system
which also allows only one verb instance to be inserted into the focus
at a time. Although the idea of a production is a computer science
term, it has been found that it can be quite efficiently mapped to
lower level terms, connectionist systems and even biological brain
functions.
The flow of cognition in ACT-R happens through the system
choosing productions based on its current buffers (largely equivalent
to the Xapagy focus or the working memory in several other systems).
The buffers can hold the current goal, its declarative memory,
perceptual and motor modules, where it goes through the matching
/selection / execution model.
ACT-R is a goal oriented system, it describes the active behavior
of an agent. In general, ACT-R emphasizes the conceptual knowledge
as encoded in the productions, and it does not focus on the episodic
knowledge.
In contrast, for the Xapagy system, the episodic knowledge is the
main focus. This is not really a choice, when we consider the fact
that the objective of the Xapagy system is is the reasoning about
stories.
The SOAR cognitive architecture
SOAR is a cognitive architecture with an active academic commu-
nity and history of successful commercial application. In its initial
version (Laird, Newell and Rosenbloom [12]) SOAR was primarily
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a symbolic production system. However, its recent development
path increasingly integrates non-symbolic memory and processing
components in the architecture (Laird [11]).
In its traditional version, SOAR has a long term memory (encoded
as production rules) and a short term memory (encoded as a symbolic
graph structure where objects are represented with properties and
relations). The SOAR system performs cognition by matching and
firing production rules. SOAR modulates the choice of the production
to fire through operators. If the current preferences are insufficient for
the choice of the production rule to fire, the SOAR system declares
an impasse, automatically creating a new sub-state with the explicit
goal to resolve it. This can be performed repeatedly and recursively,
leading to an automatic meta-reasoning structure.
The recent version of the SOAR system extends the system in
form of non-symbolic knowledge representations (and the implied
memory and processing modules) as well as new learning models
for knowledge not easily encodable in form of rules.
From the point of view of the relationship to the Xapagy system
it is important that the new version of SOAR implements episodic
memory in form of temporally ordered snapshots of working memory.
Recorded episodes can be retrieved by the creation of a cue which is
the partial specification of a working memory. The retrieved episodes
are stored in a special buffer, the exact recall of a sequence of
episodes is possible. The retrieval of episodes is also affected by
a new module modeling the activation level of working memory.
Compared with the Xapagy architecture, the main difference is,
again, the emphasis on the episodic memory placed by the Xapagy
system. SOAR defines several memory models (procedural knowl-
edge encoded as rules, semantic memory (facts about the world) with
the episodic memory being a relatively recent addition. In contrast the
episodic memory is essentially the only memory model in Xapagy21.
The cue and working memory based episodic memory retrieval
parallels the Xapagy’s continuation HLS model. There is however a
major difference in what the actual recall does. In SOAR it is possible
to accurately recall a previous episode, with the complete snapshot
of the working memory. In Xapagy this is impossible - it is not sure
that even the general outline of the recalled story will be accurately
recreated (see Section VIII-C).
The ICARUS cognitive architecture
The ICARUS system (Langley and Choi [14]) is a cognitive
architecture which focuses on cognition occurring in the physical
context. Its cognitive behavior cycle is strongly tied to the perceptual
input from the environment, with the mental structures grounded in
the perception and the actions of the agent. ICARUS models concepts
and skills as encoding different aspects of knowledge, memorized as
different cognitive structures. It assumes that each element of the
short term memory has a corresponding generalized structure in the
hierarchically organized long term memory.
Comparing ICARUS and Xapagy is difficult, as the physical,
grounded orientation of ICARUS and the story oriented application
domain of Xapagy have very little overlap. Inevitably, however,
Xapagy needs to extend towards application scenarios where the
stories are recorded as an active participant in the events (rather than
as a more or less passive observer of events or listener of narrated
stories). Thus the ICARUS system can serve as inspiration for future
Xapagy extensions for embodied action and goal directed reasoning.
21Xapagy also defines conceptual and dictionary knowledge. Conceptual
knowledge is implicitly present in SOAR (and basically all the other cognitive
architectures, even if they do not appear a separate module). Dictionary
knowledge is also necessarily present in any system which uses some kind of
external language.
The Polyscheme cognitive architecture
The Polyscheme system (Cassimatis et al. [5]) is a cognitive
architecture designed to integrate multiple different representations
and reasoning algorithms. Polyscheme reasoning proceeds through
sequential mental simulations where the different cognitive reasoning
and planning models are encapsulated in specialist modules. The
architecture allows even purely reactive components to react to
simulated states of the world, thus integrating reasoning and planning
with perception and action.
The integration of the different specialists is performed through
a common communication language, used to translate information
between specialists. Beyond this, however, each specialist can use its
own internal data representations.
The Polyscheme system implements a rigorous and consistent
way to annotate states as being in the past, hypothetical, distant or
invisible.
There are apparently irreconcilable differences between the ar-
chitectural approach of Polyscheme and Xapagy. Polyscheme is
fundamentally built on the integration of multiple representations and
reasoning models while Xapagy uses a single representation and a
shadowing as a single reasoning model.
A closer look, however, also finds many parallels. The common
language used between specialist modules can be seen as an analogue
to the Xapagy verb instance representation.
Many of the specialist modules in Polyscheme would need to
be also implemented outside the shadow/HLS reasoning model if
Xapagy would be used in their application domain. For instance in the
Polybot robot application one of the specialists identifies the location
and category of the objects using color segmentation. This obviously
cannot be implemented through shadowing - should the Xapagy
system ever be controlling a robot, the solution would roughly be
the same: a specialized visual module which communicates with the
rest of the system by inserting instances and verb instances into the
focus.
Finally, the shadow/HLS mechanism in Xapagy can be considered
a type of simulation of recent events based on past knowledge, which
is a close parallel to what the Polyscheme simulation model does.
The EPIC cognitive architecture
The EPIC cognitive architecture (Kieras and Meyer [10]) has been
implemented with the explicit goal to model the human multimodal
and multiple task performance. The EPIC architecture’s goal is
to understand and model human behavior (preferably, through a
predictive model) rather than to create an artificially intelligent agent.
As ACT-R and SOAR, EPIC is a production based system. One
of the influential differences of the EPIC system is that it does not
assume a serialized bottleneck on the firing of the productions. How-
ever, the number of productions which can be actually be instantiated
simultaneously is limited by resource limitations, for instance the
various components of the working memory, the processing speed,
and the physical limitations of sensors and actuators (eyes can focus
on one point at a time, hands can grab a single object, and so on).
What the Xapagy system can learn from EPIC is the lesson which
many other architectures have also drawn - that is, that the perceived
serialization of some aspects of human behavior can occur naturally
- they need not be enforced through artificial constraints.
The CLARION cognitive architecture
The stated goal of the CLARION architecture (Sun [28]) is to
capture cognitive modeling aspects not adequately addressed by other
cognitive architectures: the implicit-explicit interaction, the cognitive-
metacognitive interaction and the cognitive-motivational interaction.
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Overall, CLARION is an integrative model with separate functional
subsystems (such as the action centered, metacognitive and motiva-
tional subsystem). Each subsystem has a has a dual representational
structure, separately for implicit and explicit representations. This
separation of the high level (symbolic, explicit) and low level (non-
symbolic, implicit) representations is consistently carried through
throughout the architecture. These two representation models are
independently operating and compete for the right to perform an
action through well defined interaction models. For instance, the
system contains models for learning symbolic rules from subsymbolic
information. The CLARION system also contains built-in motiva-
tional and metacognitive constructs.
On a superficial look, there appears to be very little similarity
between CLARION and Xapagy. CLARION’s characteristic is that its
architecture explicitly models several dichotomies of human cognition
(explicit vs. implicit, action vs. deliberation, symbolic vs. subsym-
bolic). If one wishes to identify where a certain human reasoning
ability is modeled, a single look at the CLARION’s architectural
diagram can point to the component responsible. In contrast, Xapagy
uses a single reasoning model, shadowing, and whatever dichotomies
must appear in the external behavior, it must emerge from a unique
internal model.
Yet, despite the very different architecture, a careful comparison
study can find that parallels between the turn architectures can be
drawn. For instance, CLARION uses a mix of similarity based
and rule-based reasonings - these components can be mapped to
the various shadow maintenance activities which deploy a mix of
structural and similarity based matching techniques.
The KARMA story understanding system and related work
The KARMA system for story understanding (Narayanan [17])
had demonstrated the understanding of simple stories and narrative
fragments in the domain of international politics and economics as
described in journalism.
One feature of the system is the ability to represent, reason about,
and understand metaphors which present abstract concepts (such as
those in international politics and economy), in terms of the physical
motion, forces, terrain features. It uses the Event Structure Metaphor
that projects inferences from physical motion and manipulation to
abstract actions, goals and policies.
From the point of view of practical implementation, the KARMA
system uses a model called x-schemas which are parametrized
routines, with internal state which execute when invoked. They are
implemented as an extension to Petri-nets (to allow run-time binding,
hierarchical action sets and stochastic transitions).
The KARMA system is strongly focused on the study of aspect
the study of linguistic devices which profile and focus on the internal
temporal character of the event.
A recent paper (Lakoff and Narayanan [13]) described a roadmap
towards a system which understand human narratives by exploiting
the cognitive structures of human motivations, goals, actions, events
and outcomes. The authors outline a number of directions towards
which future narrative systems need to work, and order them in
dimensions of narrative structure: the moral system of the narrative
(stories as guides to living), folk theories of how people and things
work, overall plot structures (these are in many way resemble sum-
marizations in Xapagy), plot schemas, motif structures, and narrative
variations.
The DAYDREAMER system
The DAYDREAMER system (Mueller and Dyer [15]) was a
system which generated stories, based on, and initiated from actual
experiences. The system used in the guidance of these story creations
four goals which were identified as frequently appearing in daydream-
ing: rationalization, revenge, failure/success reversal (exploration
of alternatives), and preparation (generation of hypothetical future
scenarios).
DAYDREAMER had been strongly tied to models of emotion:
defined notions of success of a goal (which produces a positive
emotion) and failure (producing negative emotion). It proposed that
the basic mechanism for scenario generation is plannning.
The DAYDREAMER system was taking a similar approach to Xa-
pagy in the fact that both the actual experiences and the daydreamed
experiences are equally available to recall.
DAYDREAMER modeled a dynamic episodic memory (Tulving
[29], Schank [24]), constantly modified during daydreaming. In Xa-
pagy, the episodic memory is not, in fact, modified, yet the practical
impact is similar, as the way in which the recall happens through self-
shadowing, it creates a behavior compatible with a dynamic memory
for the external observer.
Recent work on narrative schemas by Chalmers and Jurafski
An body of work, with a high relevance to the Xapagy system
has been recently reported by Chambers and Jurafsky [6], [7]. The
work centers on the learning of narrative schemas, which they define
as coherent sequences or sets of events with participants who are
defined as semantic roles, which can be fitted by appropriate persons.
This work can bee seen as a restart of the semantic NLP tradition of
the 1970 and 80s, which used representations such as scripts (Shank
and Abelson [25]). This research direction had become marginalized
in the 1990’s as the knowledge engineering requirements appeared
to be overwhelming. The work of Chalmers and Jurafski promises to
reboot this research direction as the narrative schemas can be inferred
or learned in an unsupervised way from raw input.
In [6], [7] successfully show scema and role inference, starting
from preprocessed natural language. The evaluate the system using
the narrative cloze test, an variation of the classical word-based cloze
test, where an event is removed from a known narrative chain, and
the system needs to infer the missing event.
The work is very close to the Xapagy system in its external
objectives, as well as in some of the details of the processes (e.g.
some of the shadow maintenance DAs are close relatives of the
algorithms used by the authors). It is true, Chambers and Jurafsky
start from English text, not pidgin, but they are using independent
preprocessing algorithms to resolve the references (albeit with some
level of uncertainty). Practically, the input of the algorithms is closely
related to the verb instance form of the Xapagy input.
There is, however, a difference between the two approaches, which,
depending on how we look at it, is either a major philosophical
difference or an implementation detail. The assumption of Chambers
and Jurafsky is that scripts physically exist, that the agents have an
explicit data structure, which is, let us say, the restaurant schema,
which is the subject of knowledge engineering or learning.
In contrast, in Xapagy, such an internal scheme does not exist as an
explicit data structure. The reasoning model of Xapagy (shadows and
headless shadows) do not create permanent intermediary structures:
reasoning always starts with the concrete, originally memorized story
lines.
Looking from another perspective, however, the differences are
not as great. For instance, a Xapagy agent, asked to confabulate a
restaurant scene based on generic participants, will recall the same
sequence as the one which one would obtained from a narrative
schema initialized with the same participants in the specific roles.
So, for an external observer, which sees the system’s behavior but
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not the internal structure, these systems would be hard to distinguish
(at least as long as we consider typical scenarios - for atypical
scenarios, exceptions and borderline cases there is a larger freedom
of movement for both systems).
X. CONCLUSION
The Xapagy system is an active software project, in development
since 2008. It has been designed to perform narrative reasoning, that
is, to mimic the human behavior when reasoning about stories. The
objective of this paper was to convey the architecture of the system,
with an emphasis on the design decisions which differentiate it from
its peers from the artificial intelligence literature.
In order to fit the description of the architecture in a single paper,
we had to omit certain details. For instance, the spike activities and
diffusion activities which maintain the shadows and headless shadows
have been presented in an informal manner. The various narrative
reasoning modalities outlines in Section VIII would deserve separate
and extensive treatment, which will be provided in future papers.
APPENDIX A
ABBREVIATIONS, NOTATIONS AND TYPOGRAPHICAL
CONVENTIONS
This paper uses a relatively extensive list of mathematical notations
to describe the interaction between the different components of the
system.
We are also using specific typographical conventions to show the
various levels of input, intermediary values and output of the system.
These values will be enumerated here.
A. Acronyms
The following acronyms are used in the paper:
VI verb instance
CO concept overlay
VCO verb concept overlay
SA spike activity
DA diffusion activity
HLS headless shadow
B. Notations for basic components
V a verb instance
I an instance
ci a concept (an attribute or adjective)
vi a verb (or adverb)
−ci,−vi the negation of a concept or verb
C an overlay of concepts
CV a overlay of verbs
area(c) area of a concept (similar for a verb)
overlap(ci, cj) the overlap between concepts ci and cj
impact(ci, cj) the impact of concept ci over concept cj
een(C, c) explicit energy of concept c in overlay C (similar for the
verbs)
en(C, c) implicit energy of concept c in a overlay C (similar for the
verbs)
act(C, c) activation of concept c in overlay C (similar for the verbs)
C. Notations for reference resolution
match(C1, C2) the match between two concept overlays
match(V1, V2) the match between two verb overlays
D. Notations for verb instances
vitype(V ) the type of the verb instance V (can be S-V-O, S-V,
S-ADJ, S-ADV, IND)
comp(V ) the list of components of the verb instance V
V erb(V ) the verb overlay which defines the verb instance V
SubI(V ) the instance which serves as the subject of the verb
instance V (if type S-V-O, S-V, S-ADJ, IND)
ObjI(V ) the instance which serves as the object of the verb instance
V (if type S-V-O)
ObjCO(V ) the concept overlay which serves as the adjective of the
verb instance V (if type S-ADJ)
SubV I(V ) the verb instance which serves as the subject of the verb
instance V (if type S-ADV)
ObjV O(V ) the verb overlay which serves as the object adverb of
the verb instance V (if type S-ADV)
pred(V1, V2) the strength of the predecessor relationship from verb
instance V 1 to V2
succ(V1, V2) the strength of the successor relationship from verb
instance V 1 to V2
E. Notations for focus and shadow
sh(IF , IS) the participation of the instance IS in the shadow of the
focus instance IF
sh(VF , VS) the participation of the verb instance VS in the shadow
of the focus verb instance VF
MI(IF , IS) the intrinsic matching between instance IF in the focus
and instance IS in the shadow
MC(IF , IS) the contextual matching between instance IF in the
focus and instance IS in the shadow
M(IF , IS) the overall matching between instance IF in the focus
and instance IS in the shadow
MSC(VF , VS) the semi-contextual matching between verb instance
VF in the focus and verb instance VS in the shadow
M(VF , VS) the overall matching between between verb instance VF
in the focus and verb instance VS in the shadow
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